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COLLUSION, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, AND 
IMPEACHMENT 
 





“Collusion is not a crime. . .”1
 
- President Donald J. Trump, July 31, 2018 
 
 
“It remains our position that the President’s actions here, by virtue of his position 
as the chief law enforcement officer, could neither constitutionally nor legally con-
stitute obstruction because that would amount to him obstructing himself. . .” 
 
- The Trump Legal Team’s Jan. 29, 
2018,Confidential Memo to Special Pros-
ecutor Robert Mueller2 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
What happens to a country’s reputation, which is purportedly founded on the 
integrity of an honest and fair justice system, when its leader is the target of an ob-
struction of justice investigation?  Related to this, how should society react to re-
peated claims that the press is the enemy of the state?  How should anyone feel when 
the prevailing ethos seems to be references to a “witch hunt” or “fake news?”  Think 
back five years ago, did anyone think a president of the strongest country in the world 
would create policy and otherwise communicate via Twitter? 
Combine all the emotions that ran through your head while reading those ques-
tions and apply them as you read this Article.  Today, the United States of America 
has Donald Trump as its President, and he appears to be the target of an obstruction 
of justice investigation.  It appears that the President is ready to insult any perceived 
antagonist: even if it undermines the national intelligence apparatus and belittles our 
federal law enforcement.  Indeed, according to his detractors, President Trump cannot 
stop himself from brazenly interjecting and interfering with FBI investigations of il-
legal acts done by former Army Lieutenant General, Michael Flynn.  There are also 
allegations that the President even worked with foreign nationals in violation of fed-
eral election proscriptions that ultimately undermined our holiest of democratic edi-
fices—the sanctity of the vote.   
Even with all the facts that have come to light since January 2017, President 
Donald Trump and his administration clench to the narrative that the aforementioned 
allegations have no merit.  Yet, the House impeached President Bill Clinton,3 and 
was prepared to impeach Richard Nixon, before he resigned,4 for obstruction of jus-
tice, with only a fraction of the evidence that may be set forth against President 
Trump.  In the following pages, this Article will explore the merits of recent efforts 
to justify the President’s behavior, including the suggestion that collusion is not a 
crime.  Ultimately, federal law provides a clear definition of collusion, even if the 
word itself cannot be found as a defined statutory violation.  These cases provide that 
collusive acts are the predicate acts of a criminal wrong.  In a potential impeachment 
of President Trump, any acts found to be collusive may become the basis for one or 
more obstruction of justice claims or charges.  This Article also explores the federal 
offense of obstruction of justice.  The catch-all obstruction provision of 18 U.S.C. § 
1503, is accordingly examined.  After said review, three other independent legal jus-
tifications under the obstruction statutes are explored. The leading factual wrongs 
allegedly committed President Trump under the federal obstruction statutes are then 
examined.  Finally, whether a sitting president may face criminal charges is exam-
ined.  In the end, we conclude, if Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller decides there is 
a factual basis of presidential wrongdoing, and a trier of fact so agrees, federal law 
on obstruction of justice provides ample basis for articles of impeachment and possi-
bly a federal indictment. 
                                                          
3 Approved Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 20, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm.  
4   Articles of Impeachment, WATERGATE.INFO. http://watergate.info/impeachment/articles-of-im-
peachment (Article1 of the Articles of Impeachment adopted by the House Judiciary Committee on July 27, 
1974, containing an obstruction of justice charge).  
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II. THE QUESTION OF COLLUSION AND OBSTRUCTION 
 
The notion of impeaching a sitting United States President is envisioned in the 
very first iteration of the United States Constitution in Article II, Section 4, which 
provides: “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, 
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Brib-
ery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”5 
In the context of President Trump’s alleged wrongful acts, pundits,6 politicians,7 
news outlets,8 scholars,9 and even the President10 himself have expressed their views 
on whether one fact tor another rise to the level of an impeachable offense.  However, 
these commentators fail to provide the legal basis or reason why an act rises to the 
level of obstruction of justice and, accordingly, may provide the basis for a finding 
of a high crime or misdemeanor under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  As alluded 
to above, President Trump’s purported wrongful acts range from his efforts to per-
suade FBI Director James Comey to end an investigation of National Security Advi-
sor Michael Flynn.  They also include the President’s purported involvement in a 
meeting with foreign nationals who claimed to have damaging information on the 
President’s campaign opponent.11  The thrust of the potential legal wrongs with re-
spect to these and other related instances is whether the President, among other 
things, violated the federal obstruction of justice statutes.  Most recently, the Presi-
dent, his counsel, and others have attempted to morph the question of obstruction of 
justice, to a question of whether the President “colluded” with Russians or the Rus-
sian government.  
Despite the wealth of public discussion on the matter, there is surprisingly little 
discussion on the law of obstruction of justice.  An overwhelming majority of speak-
ers or guests on television and radio news stations such as CNN,12 Fox News,13 and 
                                                          
5    U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.   
6  Bob Baur, The Impeachable Offense and the Modern Presidency, LAWFARE (Sept. 14, 2017), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/impeachable-offense-and-modern-presidency. 
7 Chris Cillizza, The Democratic Case Against Impeaching President Trump, CNN 
(Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/09/politics/impeachment-trump-axelrod/index.html.  
8    Keith E. Whittington, So What Exactly Counts as an Impeachable Offense?, WASH. POST (May 24, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/24/so-what-exactly-counts-as-an-
impeachable-offense-spoiler-its-a-trick-question/?utm_term=.12b6a85d8a75.   
9  Albert Broderick, The Politics of Impeachment, 60 AM. B. ASS’N J. 5 (1974), available at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/25726736?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.  
10   Amy Davidson Sorkin, Donald Trump, Bill Clinton, and How Presidents View Impeachment, THE 
NEW YORKER (June 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trump-bill-clinton-
and-how-presidents-view-impeachment.  
11   Marshall Cohen, Trump Lawyers Say He 'Dictated' Statement on Trump Tower Meeting, Contra-
dicting Past Denials, CNN (June 2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/02/politics/trump-lawyers-statement-
trump-tower-russians/index.html;  Betsy Woodruff, White House Lawyers Say Trump Wrote Misleading Re-
sponse to Trump Tower Meeting, THE DAILY BEAST (June 2, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trumps-
own-lawyers-say-trump-wrote-white-house-response-to-trump-tower-meeting. 
12 Deval Patrick, I Support Impeaching President Trump if…, CNN (Aug. 5, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2018/08/05/deval-patrick-trump-impeachment-sotu-vpx.cnn.  
13   Bob Barr, Trump is Headed for Impeachment if Republicans Don’t do These Things to Hold the 
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MSNBC,14 to virtually every congressional leader,15 and even political candidates,16 
have opined on what they believe is tantamount to obstruction of justice in the context 
of the current investigation.  What adds to the lack of clarity on the matter, the Pres-
ident and his attorney, Rudy Giuliani, have used the term “collusion” as the basis for 
any alleged wrongful act on his part.17  Astonishingly, they even have gone as far as 
to assert that collusion is not a crime.18  Sadly, even legal experts invited to these 
programs have discussed the terms collusion and obstruction but again have failed to 
provide any depth or details, let alone law in their analyses.  That dearth of informed 
discussion on the law of obstruction of justice ends here.  Specifically, this Article 
will explore the law of obstruction of justice, from its genesis, to the early federal 
cases defining the term, to its applicability to this president, and finally, this Article 
will address whether there are any potentially successful arguments applicable to an 
obstruction claim against the forty-fifth President of the United States.  Before an in-
depth discussion on obstruction of justice and the federal statutes governing this type 
of offense, an analysis of the apparent red herring that is the claim that “collusion is 
not a crime” will be addressed.  The legal analysis of the term collusion is explored 
and ultimately dismissed as a basis to suggest no wrongdoing occurred in President 
Trump’s case. 
 
III. THE TERM COLLUSION AND ITS LEGAL GENESIS 
 
The legal term “collusion” is primarily used in the context of antitrust law, spe-
cifically under The Sherman Act, the leading federal antitrust statute.19  The purpose 
                                                          
House, FOX NEWS (June 13, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/06/13/trump-is-headed-for-im-
peachment-if-republicans-dont-do-these-things-to-hold-house.html.  
14 Maxine Waters, On Impeachment: We Can’t Wait for 2020, MSNBC (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://www.msnbc.com/all-in/watch/maxine-waters-on-impeachment-we-can-t-wait-for-2020-
1193893443537.  
15   Kaitlyn Schallhorn, Democratic Congressman Pushes to Impeach Trump: What to Know About the 
Process, FOX NEWS (May 15, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2018/05/15/democrat-congressman-
pushes-to-impeach-trump-what-to-know-about-process.html.  
16   Ian Schwartz, Tom Steyer: Trump "Has Met the Boundaries for Impeachment,” American People in 
"Great Danger", REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.realclearpoli-
tics.com/video/2017/10/28/tom_steyer_trump_has_met_the_boundaries_for_impeachment_american_peo-
ple_in_great_danger.html.  
17   William Cummings, Giuliani and Trump ‘misleading’ When They Say Collusion is Not a Crime, 
Law Professor Says, USA TODAY (July 31, 2018),  https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/poli-
tics/2018/07/31/collusion-donald-trump-giuliani-legal-definition/873358002/;  David Graham, Scandalous Be-
yond a Reasonable Doubt,, THE ATLANTIC (July 31, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2018/07/trump-collusion-not-a-crime/566417/; Brian Williams, Giuliani Says Collusion’s Not a Crime. 
But That Might Not Matter., MSNBC (July 30, 2018), https://www.msnbc.com/brian-williams/watch/giuliani-
says-collusion-s-not-a-crime-but-that-might-not-matter-1288822851876.  
18   Id.  
19   15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”); 
see also OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST, 164-66 (2005) (Both forms of coordina-
tion violate Section 1). Compare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 
(1940) (holding “a conspiracy to fix prices violates § 1 . . . though no overt act is shown ....”), with United States 
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 159 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd, 251 U.S. 417, 460 (1920).   
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of the Sherman Act, and antitrust law in general, is to prevent wrongful monopoliza-
tion and restraint of trade.20  In that context, collusion is associated with a contract or 
combination, otherwise known as a concerted action, to obtain something forbidden 
under the law.21  The theory of concerted action has become central to finding cartel-
like behavior, which is viewed as critical to antitrust policy.22  The term collusion in 
the antitrust context is defined as an agreement, contract, combination, or conspiracy 
to engage in price fixing, bid rigging, or market division of allocation for goods or 
services.23  In Tomiyosu v. Golden,24 the Nevada Supreme Court provided a useful 
definition that, although arising in an antitrust case, was general enough to provide 
guidance in a host of contexts, including impeachment.  The Tomiyosu court found 
collusion to be:  
[a]n agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of rights 
by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.25 
Federal courts as well as the Department of Justice recognize that collusion in 
the antitrust setting is a wrong—a view followed by courts in a host of other settings.  
It entails an agreement or understanding by two or more persons to obtain a result 
that is otherwise forbidden by the law.  Federal courts have repeatedly recognized the 
basic notion that collusion involves an undertaking to circumvent the requirements 
or mandates of the law.  Dating back as far as 1900, the United States Supreme 
Court,26 observed that "collusion" is “an agreement between two or more persons to 
defraud a person of his rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden 
by law.”27  More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Cagle,28 provides further guidance when it cited with 
approval the following definition and also found at least three means to find collu-
sion: 
                                                          
20   See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 
351 (1943); HANS B THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
108-59, 227 (1955); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY 
AND LAW VOLUME 1-4 (1980); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 23 (1976);  EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 10-12, 30 (1978);  JULIAN O. 
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, 23 (1983);  E. Kintner, Federal Antitrust Law 
129 (1980); Franklin D. Jones, Historical Developments Of The Law Of Business Competition, 36 Yale L.J. 
207, 218 (1926).  
21   Supra note 19. 
22   William H. Page, Objective and Subjective Theories of Concerted Action, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 215 
(2013).  
23   Id.; see also Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F3d 268 (5th Cir. 
2014) (“To satisfy the conspiracy element of a Sherman Act claim, Marucci must show “that the defendants 
engaged in concerted action, defined as having ‘a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to 
achieve an unlawful objective.’”) (emphasis supplied). 
24  Tomiyosu v. Golden, 400 P2d 415, 417 (1965), cert. denied, Haluska v. Gardner, 382 U.S. 844 
(1965). 
25   Id. at 417. 
26   Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U.S. 181, 190 (1900). 
27   Id.  
28   68 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 1995).  
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(1) A deceitful agreement between two or more persons, for one party to 
bring an action against the other for some evil purpose, such as to defraud 
a third party of its rights; 
(2) A secret arrangement between two or more persons, whose interests 
are apparently conflicting, to make use of the forms and proceedings of 
law in order to defraud a third party or to obtain that which justice would 
not give them, by deceiving a court or its officers; or 
(3) A secret combination, conspiracy or concert of action between two or 
more persons for fraudulent or deceitful purposes. 
 Central to the federal cases defining the term collusion is the recognition that a 
collusive act arises when one is engaging in behavior that seeks to circumvent the 
law.  It is that goal and intent that makes the act of colluding a wrong.  A federal 
court in UAW v. General Motors Corp.,29 put it nicely when it found collusion to be:  
“[a]n agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his 
rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.  It 
implies the existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent 
means, or of lawful means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose.  
A secret combination, conspiracy or concert of action between two or more 
persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose.”30 
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission observed, in 
a mergers and acquisitions setting, “[t]he phrase ‘coordinated interaction’ has been 
substituted for ‘collusion’ and is defined as ‘actions by a group of firms that are prof-
itable for each of them only as the result of the accommodating reactions of others.’  
The ‘coordinated interaction’ analysis boils down to whether or not the merged com-
pany could either tacitly or overtly orchestrate anti-competitive conduct among a 
group of competitors.”31  Similarly, one scholar observed that “[c]ollusion is cooper-
ation between two parties that should instead be competing, or at least maintaining 
an arm's length.  By cooperating, they seek to divvy up benefits between them, ex-
cluding other parties that might otherwise claim some of the benefits.  In other words, 
collusion is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an im-
proper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party.”32  
In the context of settling cases, for instance, scholars have similarly defined “col-
lusion” to require a secret, unethical agreement between two parties to a suit.33  In 
                                                          
29   2006 WL 334283 (E. D. Mich. 2006).  
30   Id. at 3. 
31   Simon M. Lorne & Joy Marlene Bryan, The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and The 1997 
Revisions, 11A ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS § 7:12 Westlaw (database updated 2018). 
32   J. Welby Leaman, It’s Not Always Nice To Play Nice: Collusion, Competition, and Development, 
20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 289, 290-91 (2007).  
33   John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
1343, 1367 (1995); Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Con-
troversy Requirement, and the Nature of Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006).  
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the bankruptcy context, the Second Circuit found collusion to be “secret cooperation 
for a fraudulent or deceitful purpose.”34  In the context of protective orders and aider 
and abettor liability, one scholar similarly observed: The term “collusion” is de-
fined as an “agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights 
by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.”35  In the insurance 
context, collusion has been defined using plain language from a dictionary: “Web-
ster's defines ‘collusion’ as: “a secret agreement or cooperation esp. for an illegal or 
deceitful purpose.”36 
Accordingly, the federal court decisions considering the issue all agree on the 
nature of the wrong that is collusion.  For instance, in Adair State Bank v. American 
Casualty Co., the Tenth Circuit, approved the district court's specific reliance upon 
this definition from Black's Law Dictionary.37  In a mass tort context, the court found 
collusion as:  
An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his 
rights by the forms of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law.  It 
implies the existence of fraud of some kind, the employment of fraudulent 
means, or of lawful means for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose.  
A secret combination, conspiracy or concert of action between two or more 
persons for fraudulent or deceitful purpose.38 
Therefore, it is simply incorrect to assert as a defense to a potential impeachable 
act that “collusion is not a crime.”39  In truth, it is not only a sophomoric legal ploy 
to suggest collusion is not a crime, but also ignorant and befuddling for any lawyer, 
let alone Rudy Giuliani, the President’s purported lead attorney, to suggest a defense 
to a potential obstruction of justice claim that collusion is not a crime.  Such silly 
ploys are akin to arguing that one who steals a car by towing it away has not com-
mitted a crime because the statute in question does not refer to stealing that type of 
car in that manner.  Accordingly, while claiming collusion is not a crime may be a 
useful tool to deflect from the true legal issues relating to this investigation, such 
tactics must fail under a dispassionate analysis of the law.  
 As mentioned above, collusive acts are the factual basis of the sanctionable be-
havior, or legal wrong, and if the wrong is defined as a criminal act—in the context 
of the president—they may very well be considered to rise to the level of a high crime 
or misdemeanor under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  As the above cases make 
clear, collusive acts are wrongful and may provide the factual predicate to criminal 
                                                          
34   In re New York Trap Rock Corp., 42 F.3d 747, 752 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INT'L DICTIONARY 496 (G&C Merriam Co. 1976)).  
35  Giles T. Cohen, Protective Orders, Property Interests and Prior Restraints: Can the Courts Prevent 
Media Nonparties From Publishing Court-Protected Discovery Materials, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2463, 2501 
(1996).  
36   Michael Keeley& Christopher A. Nelson, Critical Issues in Determining Employee Dishonesty Cov-
erage, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 933, 981 (2009). 
37   Id. 
38   Sofia Adrogué, Mass Tort Class Actions in the New Millennium, 17 REV. LITIG. 427, 456 (1998). 
39 Avery Anapol, Gulliani: Collusion Is Not a Crime, THE HILL, (July 30, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/399461-giuliani-collusion-is-not-a-crime.  
  Journal of Legislation 17 
or other punishment.  In the case of President Trump, much of the alleged wrongful 
acts turn on whether his conduct in several instances rose to the level of obstruction 
of justice, among other potential criminal acts.40  In particular, questions will con-
tinue to be debated regarding whether President Trump attempted to thwart the due 
and proper administration of justice.  There are several potential claims that, if 
proven, could rise to impeachable offenses.  First, is whether President Trump ob-
structed justice by requesting FBI Director James Comey to end his investigation of 
Michael Flynn, the National Security advisor.41  Flynn has subsequently pled guilty 
to several offenses, and is currently cooperating with the FBI and the Justice Depart-
ment.42  Another potential factual basis is whether President Trump knew of, ap-
proved, or was otherwise involved in a meeting, known as the Trump Tower meeting, 
between his son, Donald Jr., and Russian nationals.  The Russian nationals had links 
to the Russian government, which purportedly had incriminating evidence on 2016 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.43  The question will likely turn on whether 
these, as well as several other acts, rise to the level of obstruction of justice, and 
accordingly provide the basis for impeachment.  Before an analysis of the facts that 
may give rise to an impeachment, it is necessary to understand the applicable law of 
obstruction of justice.  
 
IV. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL OFFENSE OF OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 
 
The birthplace of the offense of obstruction of justice is the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.44  Before the current federal statutes on the matter, and their statutory an-
tecedents, legislatures feared the abuse of unilateral contempt power exercised by the 
King of Great Britain.45  Historically, obstruction of justice and contempt of court 
were closely related offenses. Today, the former may be punished as the latter when 
it occurs in the court.46  However, since 1831, “following a period of political acri-
mony fueled by a perceived overextension of judges’ power,” federal laws attempted 
to reduce the scope of a contempt of court charge by creating a separate criminal 
offense for the obstruction of justice.47 
                                                          
40   Though there may very well be other criminal charges that Special Prosecutor Mueller may conclude 
to rise to the level of impeachable acts, the focus of this Article is on obstruction of justice and whether President 
Trump’s acts, often acting with others, rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors under Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution.  
41   Stephen Collinson et. al, James Comey Testimony: Trump Asked Me to Let Flynn Investigation Go, 
CNN (June 8, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/politics/james-comey-testimony-released/index.html  
42   David S. Cloud, Flynn Confirms Cooperation with Special Counsel, Says He Wants to 'Set Things 
Right'., L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-pol-essential-washing-
ton-updates-flynn-confirms-cooperation-with-special-1512146966-htmlstory.html  
43   Marshall Cohen, Trump Lawyers Say He ‘dictated’ Statement on Trump Tower Meeting, Contra-
dicting Past Denials, CNN (June 8, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/02/politics/trump-lawyers-statement-
trump-tower-russians/index.html 
44   Daniel A. Shtob, Corruption of a Term: The Problematic Nature of 18 U.S.C. 1512(c), the New 
Federal Obstruction of Justice Provision, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1434-35 (2004).  
45   Id. at 1435.  
46   Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle., Note, 82 MICH. L. REV. 
90, 96–7 (1983). 
47   Shtob, supra note 44, at 1435. 
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Following its independence from England and the perceived abuse of authoritar-
ian power, the U.S. Congress passed a law clarifying the contempt power.48  Act of 
March 2, 1831, the predecessor to the contemporary omnibus contempt statute: § 
1503, limited punishment to conduct in the presence of the court that obstructed the 
administration of justice.49  Rather than allowing the court to punish all acts of con-
tempt of its authority wherever they may occur, Congress focused only on persons 
who “corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, intimidate, or impede 
any juror, witness, or officer, in any Court of the United States.”50 
Obstruction of justice is now recognized as meaning any “interference with the 
orderly administration of law and justice.”51  In a general sense, this phrase can also 
encompass any offense affecting government functions, such as treason, perjury, con-
tempt, and bribery.52  According to author Stuart P. Green, obstruction of justice of-
fenses “involve a complex web of harms to individual litigants, witnesses, jurors, and 
court officials, as well as to the judicial, law enforcement, and legislative systems 
more generally.”53 Additionally, engaging in conduct that obstructs justice signifi-
cantly harms the judicial system and society in general.54  As David S. Rudstein puts 
it: “[b]y intentionally misleading the court, or otherwise perverting the course of jus-
tice.  .  . an individual deliberately destroys a fundamental objective of the justice 
system: to conduct an untainted trial.”55 
To deter potential obstruction of justice and its repercussion in the judicial sys-
tem, the United States has, throughout its history, enacted laws punishing obstructive 
conduct.  Most recently, the federal government enacted §§ 1501–1520 of Title 18 in 
the United States Code to outlaw obstruction of justice.56  “The federal obstruction 
of justice statute is one of a series of federal criminal laws designed to safeguard the 
integrity of the criminal justice system and of the investigative functions of legisla-
tures and administrative agencies.”57  Section 1503, known as the catch-all provision, 
prohibits obstruction of justice, jury tampering, or any attempts to use force, threats, 
or coercion to [endeavor to] influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice.58  Related sections include §§ 1505, 1510, and 1512, which prohibit the ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees, the obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations, and tampering with a witness, victim, or informant.59 
To better understand obstruction of justice, particularly in the context of the 
                                                          
48   21 CONG. CH. 99, Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. 
49   Id. 
50   Id.  
51   Matthew Harrington et al., Obstruction of Justice, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1477, 1478 (2015). 
52   John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American Criminal Law, 65 
LA. L. REV. 49, 52 (2004). 
53   Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 13 (2005). 
54   Id.  
55   David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England Part II: The Exception to the Rule Against 
Double Jeopardy for "Tainted Acquittals", 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 217, 262 (2008). 
56   Decker, supra note 52, at 53. 
57   Joseph V. De Marco, A Funny Thing Happened on The Way to The Courthouse: Mens Rea, Docu-
ment Destruction, And The Federal Obstruction Of Justice Statute, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 571–72 (1992). 
58   Obstruction of Justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1931). 
59   See id. at § 1505, 1510, 1512. 
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Trump investigation, this Article will first address how Congress established obstruc-
tion of justice as a crime through the Act of March 2, 1831, and its evolution into 18 
U.S.C. § 1503.  Next, this Article will address Congress’s enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 
1510 to prohibit obstruction of justice before the initiation of judicial proceedings.  
Then this Article will address how Congress expanded the measures against obstruc-
tion of justice when it enacted §1512 to expand the protections granted to witnesses, 
victims, and informants. 
 
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE OMNIBUS OBSTRUCTION STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 1503 
 
“Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats of force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, ob-
struct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . .”60 
Congress first established the contempt power by passing the Judiciary Act of 
1789, but the Act failed to define contempt.61  The initial distinction of obstruction 
of justice from contempt of court arose out of a controversy surrounding Judge James 
H. Peck.62  In 1830, Judge James H. Peck was impeached by the House of Represent-
atives and tried by the Senate for abusing his contempt power when he held Luke 
Edward Lawless in contempt for publishing a letter criticizing one of Peck’s opin-
ions.63  “The extensive arguments in the Peck trial repeatedly emphasized that the 
contempt power should be limited to that necessary for the preservation of judicial 
functions.”64  After determining that the contempt power was too easily employed 
and potentially detrimental to procedural safeguards, Congress passed the Act of 
March 2, 1831, to limit the scope and contempt power of the Act of 1789.65  The Act 
of March 2, 1831, the predecessor to § 1503, limited punishment to conduct that ob-
structed the administration of justice in the presence of the court.66  Rather than al-
lowing the court to punish all acts of contempt wherever they may occur, Congress 
focused only on persons who “corruptly, or by threats or force, endeavor to influence, 
intimidate, or impede any juror, witness, or officer, in any Court of the United 
States.”67  The Act established obstruction of justice as a separate crime from con-
tempt and required that those accused of the offense be charged by indictment and 
tried by a jury.68 
Furthermore, in enacting the Act of March 2, 1831, Congress created a divide 
between conduct taking place in or near the court, and conduct outside the court: 69  
 
                                                          
60   Id. § 1503.  
61   Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts, supra note 46, at 98. 
62   Id.  
63   Id. at 98. 
64   Id.  
65   Shtob, supra note 44, at 1435. 
66   21 CONG. CH. 99, Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. 
67   Id.  
68 JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN, & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, DESTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, § 5.3 
(1989).   
69   United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 592 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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[M]isbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts, or 
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice” constituted con-
tempt under section 1 of the Act of March 2, 1831, whereas persons outside 
of court who “corruptly, or by threats of force, obstruct, or impede, or en-
deavor to obstruct or impede, the due administration of justice” committed 
the crime of obstruction of justice under section 2.70 
The Supreme Court differentiated in court versus out of court wrongful conduct 
in the Nye v. United States, where a majority reversed a district court’s judgment 
convicting the petitioner for contempt of court.71  The Court reversed the conviction 
because the petitioner’s misbehavior had occurred 100 miles away from the location 
of the district court in which the action was brought, and thus was not considered in 
the “presence” of the court nor “near thereto.”72  The Court reasoned that ‘near 
thereto’ referred to a geographical proximity to the court and not a proximity in casual 
relationship.73  The Court explained that § 2 of the Act of March 2, 1831 expressly 
includes actions that can interfere with the administration of justice but do not take 
place in or near the court.74  Therefore, the Court must maintain a meticulous regard 
for the separate categories of offenses, “so that the instances where there is no right 
to jury trial will be narrowly restricted.”75  Lastly, the Court explains that the two 
sections of the Act must be read together, and as a result “the category of criminal 
cases which could be tried without a jury was narrowly confined.”76  The Congres-
sional purpose behind the Act of 1831 was not only to limit the contempt power of 
the Court, but also to prevent summary punishments that violate the “procedural safe-
guards of the Bill of Rights.”77 
As a result, Congress successfully limited the abuse of contempt power and es-
tablished the crime of obstruction of justice through the Act of March 2, 1831.  This 
act has been codified into two separate pieces.78  Section 1 of the Act survives today 
as 18 U.S.C. § 401, the contempt statute, while § 2 survived through 18 U.S.C. § 
1503.79  Courts have reasoned that obstruction of justice is to be applied to conduct 
                                                          
70   Id.; 21 CONG. CH. 99, Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487. 
71   Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 52, (1941) 
72   Id. at 40, 52.  
73   Id. at 54.  
74   Id. at 49.  
75   Id.  
76   Id. at 47.  
77   Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404, (1956). 
78   United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 592 (9th Cir. 2015). 
79   18 U.S.C. § 1503 (“Influencing or injuring officer or juror generally (a) Whoever corruptly, or by 
threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede 
any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be serving at any 
examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in 
the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any 
verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any 
such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the per-
formance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of jus-
tice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection with 
a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or physical 
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outside the court’s proceedings because such was the intent of Congress,80 and that 
interpretation is compatible with other statutes.81  For instance, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1621 and 1623, “a false statement made during in-court testimony constitutes per-
jury.”82  Additionally, under 18 U.S.C. § 401, a refusal to answer a material question 
during in-court testimony constitutes contempt.83  
In terms of the overall structure of the obstruction provisions, §§ 1501 through 
1520 of Title 18 in the United States Code reflect the various types of outlawed be-
havior.  As Professor Decker in his leading work on the provisions’ structure ob-
serves, the individual sections identify a host of acts giving rise to criminal offenses, 
including: “assault on a process server,”84 “resistance to extradition agent,”85 “influ-
encing or injuring officer or juror generally,”86 “influencing juror by writing,”87 “ob-
struction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees,”88 “theft or 
alteration of records or process; false bail,”89 “picketing or parading,”90 “recording, 
listening to, or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while deliberating or 
voting,”91 “obstruction of court orders,”92 “obstruction of criminal investiga-
tions,”93 “obstruction of State or local law enforcement,”94 “tampering with a wit-
ness, victim, or an informant,”95 “retaliating against a witness, victim, or an inform-
ant,”96 “obstruction of Federal audit,”97 “obstructing examination of financial 
institution,”98 “obstruction of criminal investigations of health care offenses,”99 “de-
                                                          
force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that 
otherwise provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such 
case. (b) The punishment for an offense under this section is (1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided 
in sections 1111 and 1112 [18 USCS §§ 1111 and 1112]; (2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in 
which the offense was committed against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, impris-
onment for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and (3) in any other case, imprisonment for 
not more than 10 years, a fine under this title, or both.”). 
80   Id. at 592 (quoting Nye, 313 U.S. at 50, “[w]e cannot by process of interpretation obliterate the 
distinctions which Congress drew.”). 
81   Bonds, 784 F.3d at 592.  
82   Id.  
83   Id. at 193; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (stating that a court of the United States has the power to 
punish the “misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of 
justice”). 
84   18 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
85   18 U.S.C. § 1502 (2000). 
86   Id. § 1503. 
87   Id. § 1504. 
88   Id. § 1505. 
89   Id. § 1506. 
90   Id. § 1507. 
91   Id. § 1508. 
92   Id. § 1509. 
93   Id. § 1510. 
94   18 U.S.C.A. § 1511 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003). 
95   Id. § 1512. 
96   Id. § 1513. 
97   Id. § 1516. 
98   18 U.S.C.A. § 1517 (2000). 
99   Id. § 1518. 
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struction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bank-
ruptcy,”100and “destruction of corporate audit records.”101  Beyond the above provi-
sions are two other sections, one which reflects a civil action measure102 and another 
that sets out basic definitions.103   
Section 1503, the omnibus obstruction provision, also applies to a broad range 
of conduct, and thus giving rise to its broad and global name.  The provision states 
as follows: 
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand 
or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or of-
ficer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding before 
any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the 
discharge of his duty, . . . or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any 
threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of jus-
tice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).104 
After the Act of March of 1831, created the obstruction of justice as a separate 
crime, 18 U.S.C. §1503 has continued to address the same behaviors as its predeces-
sor.  Section 1503, which governs obstruction of justice affecting jurors, officers of 
the court, and judges, is considered a catch-all provision that applies to a broad range 
of conduct.105  Its main purpose is to protect jurors and judicial officers from threats, 
intimidation, retaliation, and other miscellaneous corrupt conduct.106  The broad cov-
erage of § 1503, statute stems from the use of what is called the Omnibus Clause: 
“corruptly endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, and impede the ... grand jury inves-
tigation.”107  The goal of including this clause in the provision was to “ensure that 
criminals [cannot] circumvent the law's purpose by devising novel and creative 
schemes that would interfere with the administration of justice but would nonetheless 
fall outside the scope of § 1503's specific prohibitions.”108  Due to its general nature, 
courts referred to § 1503(a) as a catch-all provision.109  Although the provision is 
broad in nature, courts generally consider that the word “corruptly,” used in § 1503, 
means that a corruptive motiv 
e caused the act, or, in other words, the purpose of the act was to obstruct jus-
tice.110  If § 1503 is interpreted as applying to in-court obstruction of the administra-
tion of justice, it would be duplicative and even superfluous due to overlap with other 
                                                          
100   18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 (Supp. 2003). 
101   Id. § 1520. 
102   Id. § 1514. 
103   Id. § 1515. 
104   18 U.S.C.A. § 1503. 
105   Devika Singh, Obstruction of Justice, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 1605, 1607 (2017).  
106   Id.  
107   United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598, (1995).  
108   Harrington et al., supra note 51, at 1479..  
109   Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598.  
110   United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Rasheed, 
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statutes.111 
To prove a violation of § 1503, the government must establish: (1) there is a 
pending judicial proceeding;112 (2) the defendant had knowledge or notice of the said 
proceeding;113 and (3) the defendant acted or attempted to act corruptly with the in-
tent of influencing, obstructing, or impeding the proceeding in the due administration 
of justice.114  If the government establishes the prima facie case of obstruction of 
justice, there are only a few potentially successful defenses.115  Only two defenses to 
§ 1503 have had mild success.116  The effective defenses are an expired statute of 
limitations, and fear of reprisal when related to testimony in front of a jury.117  In 
contrast, even constitutional challenges “based on vagueness, overbreadth, and insuf-
ficient notice have failed.”118   
 
A.  The Pivotal “Pending Proceeding” Requirement of Section 1503 
 
Particularly, in the context of the special prosecutor’s investigation of President 
Trump, § 1503’s requirement of a “pending proceeding” may very well be an issue 
of great debate and considerable court and perhaps congressional filings.  Trump’s 
legal team and supporters will likely argue that the purported acts in question oc-
curred well before a grand jury was empaneled or other judicial proceeding was un-
derway.  According to this line of thought, § 1503’s pendency requirement was there-
fore not met.  In United States v. Aguilar, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, in order 
to constitute a violation of § 1503, a defendant's conduct must have some “nexus”—
i.e., some “relationship in time, causation, or logic”—to a judicial proceeding, so that 
the false statements have the “natural and probable effect” of interfering with that 
judicial proceeding.119  In terms of determining when a pending proceeding is pre-
sent, Professor Decker found that federal courts have often refrained from developing 
a “rigid rule” to determine at what point a judicial proceeding becomes pend-
ing.120  Other scholars, arguably taking a more regimented view, conclude that “§ 
1503 does not give authority to prosecute obstruction of an independent government 
                                                          
663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233, 238 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 825, (1980); United States v. Haas, 583 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981, (1979). 
111   Id. at 193. 
112   United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that in order to convict 
someone of violating § 1503, the government must prove that there was a judicial proceeding underway); see 
also Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893) (construing predecessor statute to § 1503). 
113   Singh, supra note 105, at 1609; see also United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 
1989) (delineating the elements of § 1503 as having “three core elements”).  
114   See Singh supra note 105.  
115   Id. at 1618. 
116   Id. at 1620.  
117   Id.; see e.g. United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1579 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant 
charged with obstructing justice for refusing to testify as a witness may in certain circumstances be entitled to 
acquittal upon proof that his refusal was based solely upon a realistic and reasonable perception that giving 
testimony would result in imminent harm to the safety of the witness or members of his family). 
118   Singh, supra note 105, at 1629.   
119   United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995). 
120   Decker, supra note 52, at 54. 
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investigation or official proceeding not connected with a pending judicial proceed-
ing.,” but a proceeding can be described as pending if an investigation is conducted 
“as an aid to” or “in furtherance of” the grand jury investigation121  While as the 
subsequent paragraphs highlight, there is considerable debate in the circuits concern-
ing the “pending proceeding” requirement, most scholars agree that there should not 
be strict adherence to the requirement of a pending proceeding. The Eleventh Circuit 
explained in United States v. Veal,122 convictions of obstruction of justice under § 
1503 should not be limited by a jurisdictional basis that strictly requires official pro-
ceedings: 
[F]ederal jurisdiction under [obstruction of justice statutes is] based on the 
federal interest of protecting the integrity of potential federal investiga-
tions by ensuring that transfers of information to federal law enforcement 
officers and judges relating to the possible commission of federal offenses 
be truthful and unimpeded.123 
An analysis of the federal circuit opinions on the issue of pendency leads one to 
conclude that there is at least a three-way split in the circuits concerning what gives 
rise to,124 and when is a “pending proceeding” present.  The First, Second, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits contain decisions where the courts have concluded a pend-
ing proceeding is present if there is an investigation related to a sitting grand 
jury.125  For instance, in United States v. Dwyer, the First Circuit held that defendant 
who made false statements to FBI agents when a grand jury proceeding was under-
way and the investigation was in connection to that proceeding, constituted a viola-
tion of § 1503.126  In United States v. Genao, the Second Circuit refused to find a § 
1503 violation because there was no grand jury proceeding at the time the defendant 
made false statements.127  In United States v. Grubb, the Fourth Circuit found false 
                                                          
121  Harrington et al., supra note 51, at 1482 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 
(1995) (holding that false statements made to an agent are not sufficient to trigger § 1503 without showing 
defendant knew his statements would be relayed to a grand jury)); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 
862 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that aiding and abetting illegal aliens by helping them escape from custody is not 
obstruction of justice; “custody” is not a pending judicial proceeding); Macari, 453 F.3d at 936 (holding that 
investigation by Federal Bureau of Investigation does not constitute a pending proceeding under § 1503 unless 
it is an extension of a grand jury investigation); United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 239-40 (3d Cir. 
1999) (finding wiretap investigation of defendant is not pending judicial proceeding, and is thus insufficient to 
invoke § 1503); cf. United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that, to establish con-
spiracy to commit obstruction of justice, there must be proof that defendants could reasonably foresee the em-
paneling of a grand jury and that their fraudulent statements would be passed along to the grand jury). But 
see Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d 517, 523-24 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that false statements during an 
investigation by the FBI, which acts on behalf of the grand jury, is a violation of § 1503). 
122   United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1250 (11th Cir. 1998). 
123   Id.  
124   At this juncture, readers should appreciate that in this section the authors have organized and 
segregated the relevant cases differently than other scholars on the subject.  Whereas Harrington and co-authors 
organized these cases based on general references to a proceeding, the analysis herein is focused on whether in 
fact a proceeding was in place and ongoing.  Thus, it is in this section where legitimate debate will likely 
continue.  
125   Harrington, supra note 51, at 1482. 
126   United States v. Dwyer, 238 F. App'x 631, 650 (1st Cir. 2007).   
127   United States v. Genao, 343 F.3d 578, 585 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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statements to FBI agents in endeavoring to get FBI agents to give false information 
to grand jury as violative of § 1503.128  In United States v. Wood, the Tenth Circuit 
similarly found that where a grand jury was underway, an effort to interfere with said 
proceeding violates § 1503.129  In U.S. v. Washington Water Power Co., the Ninth 
Circuit held “[w]e have previously held that a federal proceeding is “pending” for 
purposes of § 1503 as soon as a complaint has been filed with a magistrate.”130 
Decisions in Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, provide what may be considered 
a slightly more liberal reading of § 1503, holding that the pending proceeding re-
quirement is met when an investigation is serving as an aid to and arm of a grand 
jury.  In United States v. Monus, the Sixth Circuit held “[o]ur inquiry into whether a 
grand jury proceeding is pending focuses on ‘whether the subpoena is issued in fur-
therance of an actual grand jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently contemplated 
presentation of evidence before the grand jury.”’131  In U.S. v. Davis, the Third Cir-
cuit refused to find a pending proceeding where there was a grand jury empaneled, 
but the government failed to show the grand jury had some relationship to the inves-
tigation that was obstructed.132  
In yet a third line of cases, the Fifth, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuit Courts of Appeals have decisions within them that have taken a broad 
view in determining when a proceeding is pending.  For instance, in United States v. 
Vesich, the Fifth Circuit found that the pending proceeding requirement was met 
where defendant did not object to an instruction that “a proceeding was pending” 
when one was “initiated but not yet settled or decided.”133  Here, the Fifth Circuit 
appears to have been somewhat lax in terms of what it takes to meet the pending 
proceeding requirement.  The Vesich court specifically stated “we have long held that 
the issuance of a subpoena is not necessary to trigger application of the obstruction 
of justice statute…. we too decline to establish a rule “by which some formal act of 
the grand jury will be required to establish ‘pendency.’”134  The Vesich court found 
the determining factor concerning pendency is “whether the subpoena is issued in 
furtherance of an actual grand jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently contem-
plated presentation of evidence before the grand jury.”135  Similarly, in U.S. v Kumar, 
the Second Circuit, found “[a]lthough ‘§ 1503’s application typically begins after the 
commencement of formal judicial proceedings,’ in this case, [the defendant] con-
cedes that, when he lied, he knew that “formal judicial proceedings” were not only 
possible or likely, but that the government intended to bring them.  Such obstructive 
behavior during a federal investigation—whether that investigation is conducted by 
a grand jury, or by a federal agency like the SEC where there is also a “quite strong, 
                                                          
128   United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 1993).  
129   United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993). 
130   United States v. Washington Water Power Co., 793 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1998).  
131   United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 389 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Our inquiry into whether a grand jury 
proceeding is pending focuses on ‘whether the subpoena is issued in furtherance of an actual grand jury inves-
tigation, i.e., to secure a presently contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand jury.’” (quot-
ing United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 612 n.6 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
132   United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1999).  
133   United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 1984).  
134   Id. at 456. 
135   Id. 
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perhaps inescapable” inference that the witness's statements “would be presented to 
[a] grand jury”—is covered by § 1503(a). . .”136  Therefore, despite the fairly narrow 
Second Circuit opinion in Genao,137 where the court refused to find pendency be-
cause there was no grand jury at the time of the investigation, the same circuit seven 
years later found a broad reading of § 1503.  Thus, the Second Circuit in Kumar, 
specifically allowed for a finding pendency even in the absence of any proceeding 
that was underway.  In yet another broad reading of pendency, in U.S. v. Marcari, 
the defendant argued the government failed to establish a pending judicial proceeding 
because it failed to prove that a grand jury had been empaneled at the time of defend-
ant’s alleged act of obstruction of justice.138  The Seventh Circuit in Marcari, held a 
governmental agency investigation can mark the beginning of a judicial proceeding 
so long as the agency is acting “as an aid to and as an “arm of the grand jury.”139  The 
court further stated, “in order to establish that an FBI investigation constituted a “ju-
dicial proceeding” for purposes of § 1503, the government must establish that the 
FBI undertook the investigation to supply information to the grand jury on this issue 
in direct support of a grand jury investigation.140  To establish that the FBI was acting 
as an arm of the grand jury, the government must demonstrate that the FBI agents 
were “integrally involved” in the grand jury investigation.”141  Much like the conflict 
within the Second Circuit, despite the Wash. Power & Light Co., decision from the 
Ninth Circuit mentioned above, in United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, the Ninth Circuit 
found a pending proceeding requirement was met when defendant made false state-
ments to probation officer, even though complaint had not yet been filed and it was 
immaterial that complaint was filed minutes after interview instead of minutes be-
fore.142  
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have taken a broad reading of § 1503 even a 
step further, and concluded a pending judicial proceeding is not required.143  For in-
stance, in United States v. Novak, the Eighth Circuit held “[T]here is nothing on the 
face of § 1503 requiring a pending proceeding.”144  The Novak court looked to the 
history of the obstruction statute and argued the Supreme Court decision in Aguilar, 
approved the recognition of certain “metes and bounds on the very broad language 
                                                          
136   United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 650 n.8 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). 
137   Genao, 343 F.3d at 585. 
138   United States v. Macari, 453 F.3d 926, 936 (7th Cir. 2006). 
139   Id. (quoting United States v. Fassnacht, 332 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2003))); see United States v. 
Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 389 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Our inquiry into whether a grand jury proceeding is pending focuses 
on ‘whether the subpoena is issued in furtherance of an actual grand jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently 
contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand jury.”’ (quoting United States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 
612 n.6 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
140   Id.  
141   See Macari, 453 F.3d at 936.  
142   United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1491-92 (9th Cir. 1985).  
143   See United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is nothing on the face of § 
1503 requiring a pending proceeding.”); United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 1999) (disa-
greeing with Fifth Circuit and holding that conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice will not always require 
pending judicial proceeding to be in existence when defendants formed conspiracy); United States v. Veal, 153 
F.3d 1233, 1250 n.24 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In the second and third clauses of § 1503, the federal interest originates 
from the status of the targeted person, a federal juror, but no judicial proceeding is required.”). 
144   United States v. Novak, 217 F.3d 566, 572 (8th Cir. 2000).  
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of the catchall provision” and has required some “nexus” between the misconduct 
and the administration of justice….holding that “uttering false statements to an in-
vestigating agent ... who might or might not testify before a grand jury” is insufficient 
to make out violation of § 1503’s catch-all provision.145  According to the Aguilar 
Court’s “nexus” analysis, “the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic 
with the judicial proceedings.”146  Similarly, in United States v. Vaghela, the Elev-
enth Circuit, held that conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice will not require 
pending judicial proceeding to be in existence when defendants formed conspir-
acy.147  Accordingly, while there may be debate on how to characterize the varying 
views from the different circuits, the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits contain opinions from those jurisdictions with liberal interpretations of 
§ 1503’s pending proceeding requirement.  
In the end, it is highly likely that the pending proceeding requirement of § 1503 
will be the most debated and potentially litigated issue in a potential Trump impeach-
ment or indictment.  While the authority on the matter is filled with differing posi-
tions, in the end, a conservative U.S. Supreme Court, if the matter would ever get to 
the Court, will likely take a plain meaning approach towards § 1503’s pendency re-
quirement. What is far more likely to occur is that Special Counsel Mueller submits 
a report to the acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein or his replacement or supe-
rior.  If Rosenstein is still in office, he will then forward the report and recommenda-
tion to the U.S. House of Representatives for consideration, which may include an 
impeachment trial.  What remains to be seen is whether Robert Mueller’s team will 
conclude that a § 1503 obstruction of Justice charge is warranted.  What is far more 
likely, is that the Special Prosecutor will recommend, or actually pursue charges 
based on conspiracy to obstruct justice.  If the Special Prosecutor concludes the facts 
warrant such a charge or recommendation, there will be few, if any legal impediments 
to a conspiracy to obstruct justice charge or recommended charge. 
 
B.  Establishing Intent Through the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine 
 
Another required element under § 1503 is the intent requirement.  In United 
States v. Aguilar, the Supreme Court established that for a conviction under § 1503, 
the acts constituting obstruction must be made with the specific intent to influence 
judicial or grand jury proceedings.148  However, courts have affirmed convictions 
where specific intent was established through a natural and probable consequences 
effect:  
The government is not required to prove . . . that the defendant harbored 
the specific purpose of obstructing the due administration of justice; all the 
government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably 
foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his 
                                                          
145   Id.  
146   Id. 
147   United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 1999).   
148   515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (citing United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
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scheme would achieve precisely that result.149 
In United States v. Silverman, the Court addressed both the intent and knowledge 
prerequisites by holding that the natural and probable consequences of paying a law-
yer to “fix” a case would be to get favorable sentences, thus interfering with the due 
administration of justice.150  Furthermore, a defendant does not need to know with 
absolute certainty that his conduct will affect judicial proceedings, nor do his acts 
need to directly and immediately obstruct justice.151  The conduct must only have the 
“natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.”152  
Therefore, if the act constituting obstruction has some natural and probable “relation-
ship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings,” the defendant intended 
and knowingly tried to obstruct.153 
 
VI.  CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE UNDER SECTION 1503 
 
In what may be most troubling to the Trump team concerning the obstruction of 
justice statutes is a claim of conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Such a claim will likely 
prove considerably more fruitful to the prosecution in a criminal setting or in an im-
peachment trial.  To sustain a conviction of conspiracy to obstruct justice under § 
1503, the government must establish: 
   
(1) That the defendant:  
(a) knowingly entered into an agreement with another,  
(b) with knowledge, or at least anticipation, of a pending judicial            
proceeding, and 
(c) with the specific intent to impede that proceeding; and  
(2) the commission of at least one overt act in furtherance of the               
conspiracy.154 
 
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit made an important distinction between obstruc-
tion of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice by highlighting the pending proceed-
ing requirement: 
In order to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice. . . the 
government need not always show that a judicial proceeding existed at the 
time the defendants formed the conspiracy, but must demonstrate that the 
                                                          
149   United States v. Brenson, 104 F3d 1267, 1277 (11th Cir. 1997).  
150   745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
151   See United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1990). 
152   Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. 
153   Id. at 600; see also United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir. 1993) (asking the grand 
juror to disclose secret information about the grand jury investigation had the natural and probable effect of 
impeding the due administration of justice); see generally United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1274 
(4th Cir. 1979) (holding that a defendant who intentionally undertakes an act, the reasonably foreseeable con-
sequence of which is to obstruct justice, violates § 1503 even if his hope is that the judicial process will not be 
seriously impaired). 
154   United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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actions the conspirators agreed to take were directly intended to prevent or 
otherwise obstruct the processes of a specific judicial proceeding in a way 
that is more than merely “speculative.” 155 
Although “investigations undertaken with the intention of presenting evidence 
before a grand jury are sufficient to constitute ‘the due administration of justice’ un-
der Section 1503,” the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cueto, 156 held that con-
victions of conspiracy to obstruct justice must only demonstrate that the conspirators 
agreed to impede anticipated judicial proceedings.157  
Thus, when considering a conspiracy to obstruct justice, federal appellate courts 
from different circuits have made clear that there is no required “pending proceeding” 
prerequisite under § 1503.158  As the lead author here wrote over a year ago when the 
allegations of President Trump’s alleged obstruction were first aired: 
Federal courts, for instance, have not insisted upon the “pending proceed-
ing” requirement to find the related obstruction violation of conspiracy to 
obstruct justice.  Indeed, several federal courts in more than one federal 
circuit have recognized, pending proceedings are not required for conspir-
acies to obstruct justice.159 
 In U.S. v. Vaghela, for instance, the Eleventh Circuit observed that “in order to 
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 
U.S.C. § 1503, the government need not always show that a judicial proceeding ex-
isted at the time the defendants formed the conspiracy, but must demonstrate that the 
actions the conspirators agreed to take were directly intended to prevent or otherwise 
obstruct the processes of a specific judicial proceeding in a way that is more than 
merely ‘speculative.’”160  Likewise, in U.S. v. Abbell, a federal appellate court stated: 
“in Vaghela, we said the requirement that defendants’ acts have the natural and prob-
able effect of interfering with the due administration of justice is not so narrow as to 
exclude efforts ‘to obstruct specific future judicial proceedings.’”161  In Torzala v. 
                                                          
155   United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. Varela 
Garcia, 533 F. App’x. 967, 983 (11th Cir. 2013). 
156   151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1998). 
157   United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1987) (conspirators who took steps to obstruct 
a federal proceeding that they anticipated would commence in a future were properly convicted of conspiracy 
to obstruct justice); see also United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 243 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The lack of evidence 
that a grand jury proceeding was pending is not dispositive on [a count of conspiracy to obstruct justice]” and 
nexus requirement is satisfied where conspirators “knew of or anticipated a grand jury investigation”); United 
States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that overt acts committed two years before a grand 
jury investigation commenced could not sustain a conviction of obstruction of justice, but defendants could still 
be charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice in the future, and conspirators who “expect or fear” that federal 
proceedings will be instituted can be prosecuted for conspiracy to obstruct justice). 
158   See e.g., United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also United States v. 
Varela Garcia, 533 F. App’x. 967, 983 (11th Cir. 2013). 
159   Ediberto Roman, Pundits Misguided on Trump’s Alleged Obstruction of Justice Charges, HUFF-
INGTON POST (June 13, 2017,) https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/pundits-on-trumps-alleged-obstruction-
of-justice-charges. 
160   169 F.3d 729 (11th Cir. 1999). 
161   271 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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United States, the Seventh Circuit upheld obstruction of justice charge under § 1503 
despite defendant’s argument that there was no pending proceeding.  The court spe-
cifically found that defendant’s agreement to the trial court’s charge that there was a 
pending proceeding sufficed to meet § 1503’s requirements.162  Later, in United 
States v. Kumar, the Second Circuit reiterated the difference between the two of-
fenses by focusing on the conspirator’s knowledge and corrupt intent.163  
Although there is support for a broad reading of § 1503 that includes “investiga-
tions undertaken with the intention of presenting evidence before a grand jury are 
sufficient to constitute ‘the due administration of justice’ under Section 1503,”164 the 
Third Circuit in United States v. Messerlian, made clear that convictions of conspir-
acy to obstruct justice need only demonstrate that the conspirators agreed to impede 
anticipated judicial proceedings.165  The Messerlian, court found that a violation of 
the obstruction of justice statutes where conspirators, who took steps to obstruct a 
federal proceeding that they anticipated would commence in a future, were properly 
convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice.166  Similarly, in United States v. Davis, 
the Third Circuit held “[t]he lack of evidence that a grand jury proceeding was pend-
ing is not dispositive on [a count of conspiracy to obstruct justice]” and the nexus 
requirement is satisfied where conspirators “knew of or anticipated a grand jury in-
vestigation.” And in what may be the most troubling for anyone facing a potential 
conspiracy to obstruct justice charge, the appellate court in United States v. Perlstein, 
held that overt acts committed two years before a grand jury investigation com-
menced could not sustain a conviction of obstruction of justice, but defendants could 
still be charged with conspiracy to obstruct justice in the future, and conspirators who 
“expect or fear” that federal proceedings will be instituted can be prosecuted for con-
spiracy to obstruct justice.167 
If, in fact, Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller and his team deem the facts in the 
Trump related investigation to warrant potential allegations of conspiracy to obstruct 
justice, such a claim will probably not be brought in a courtroom against a sitting 
president (a matter covered by Section VIII below), but may nevertheless provide the 
basis for impeachment charges in the House of Representatives.  Whereas obstruction 
of justice claims pursuant to § 1503 may prove to be at the very least the subject of 
considerable debate, as discussed above concerning the 1503’s pending pleading re-
quirement, there is little doubt that if the facts so establish, there is ample legal basis 
to bring a claim or charge based upon conspiracy to obstruct justice.  
In the sections below, other potential legal basis—18 U.S.C. §§ 1510 and 1512—
for obstruction will be analyzed.  This will be followed by a brief overview of pur-
ported facts concerning some of the potential claims relating to a potential Trump 
                                                          
162   See Torzala v. United States, 545 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2008). 
163   617 F.3d 612, 621 n. 8 (2d Cir. 2010) (“it is well established that investigations undertaken with 
the intention of presenting evidence before a grand jury are sufficient to constitute ‘the due administration of 
justice’ under section 1503,”). 
164   United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1998). 
165   United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1987). 
166   Id. 
167   126 F.2d 789, 795 (3d Cir. 1942) 
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impeachment trial.  Finally, the question of whether a sitting president can be prose-
cuted in a criminal court will be examined briefly.  
 
VII. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE UNDER § 1512: PROTECT WITNESSES, VICTIMS, OR 
INFORMANTS 
 
On October 12, 1982, Congress passed Public Law 97-291, referred to as Victim 
and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”), to provide additional protection and 
assistance to victims and witnesses in Federal cases.168  Section 1512 to Title 18 of 
the United States Code was originally enacted as part of the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act of 1982, resulting from Congress’s effort to address witness tampering.169  
In the VWPA, Congress found and declared that under the previous laws, the criminal 
justice system failed to offer “adequate protection or assistance” when victims and 
witnesses were threatened or intimidated because of their cooperation with law en-
forcement agencies.170  
When Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, it explic-
itly declared that the purposes of the VWPA were: (1) “to enhance and protect the 
necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process;” (2) “to 
ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of available 
resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing on the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant;” and (3) “to provide a model for legislation for State 
and local governments.”171  The two former purposes are most relevant to the present 
discussion.  This resulted from Congress’s concern with the shortcomings of previ-
ously enacted legislation.  
Prior to the VWPA, witness protection was limited in scope and inadequate in 
offering a prosecutor “the appropriate tools to deal specifically with a defendant who 
influenced or otherwise hindered a witness from providing information to federal law 
enforcement officers regarding the investigation of a crime.”172  Prior to 1982, § 1503 
was the only law available to prosecute obstructive conduct involving witnesses in a 
federal court proceeding.173  In its 1948 version, § 1503 read:   
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or 
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any wit-
ness, in any court of the United States ... or injures any party or witness in 
his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such 
court ... or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter 
pending therein, or injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or 
property on account of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on 
                                                          
168   Victim and Witness Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97–291, 96 Stat 1248 (1982). 
169   Id. at Sec. 4.   
170   Id. at Sec. 2(a)(1)-(4).  
171   Id. at Sec. 2(b). 
172   Brian M. Haney, Contrasting the Prosecution of Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 
18 U.S.C. § 1512: Why § 1512 Better Serves the Government at Trial, 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 57 
(2004).  
173   Tina M. Riley, Tampering with Witness Tampering: Resolving the Quandary Surrounding 18 
U.S.C. S 1503, 1512, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 249, 253 (1999). 
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account of his being or having been such juror, or injures any such officer, 
commissioner, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on 
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats 
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
structs or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.174  
Under this version of § 1503, the government was required to prove that the ac-
tions taken by the defendant were specifically intended to influence a witness.175  
Furthermore, to prosecute under § 1503, it was required that the judicial proceeding 
had been initiated.176  Lastly, the 1948 version offered limited protection to witnesses, 
excluding all other persons involved in a judicial proceeding.177  More recently, the 
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Veal, after examining the legislative history of § 
1512 held ” [b]y its wording, § 1512 does not depend on the existence or immanency 
of a federal case or investigation but rather on the possible existence of a federal 
crime and a defendant's intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime.”178 
The legislative history of § 1512 shows that Congress was quite exhaustive in 
voicing its concerns with the prior laws.  The first concern was “the high threshold 
of seriousness for the commission of a crime.”179  For example, § 1503 is limited 
only to the protection against corruption, threat, and force during a judicial proceed-
ing.  Additionally, § 1510 is limited to protection against bribery, misrepresentation, 
intimidation, force, and threat during a federal investigation.180  Neither §§ 1503 nor 
1510 protect victims or witnesses against conduct that is “knowingly and maliciously 
hindering, delaying, preventing or dissuading testimony or reports to law enforce-
ment officers.”181  Another concern was that § 1503 failed to extend protection to 
informants, and § 1510 did not include friends and families of the victim or wit-
ness.182  Lastly, a concern was that prior to the VWPA, the law did not address verbal 
harassment as a form of intimidation.183  Congress expressed that simple acts such as 
telephoning a victim, going to their home, or driving by can sometimes be extremely 
effective in preventing a victim or witness from testifying.184   
The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 offered an extensive reform to 
witness tampering.  First, the VWPA eliminated all references to witnesses from § 
1503 and added a group of sections under § 1512 to expand the protection afforded 
                                                          
174   Teresa Anne Pesce, Defining Witness Tampering Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1417, 1435 (1986) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1948) (amended 1982)).  
175   Id. at 1419.  
176   Id. at 1430. 
177   Haney, supra note 172, at 75.  
178   United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1250 n.24 (11th Cir. 1998). 
179   S. REP. NO. 97-532, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520 (1982). 
180   Id.  
181   Id. 
182   Id. 
183   Id. at 2521. 
184   Id.  
  Journal of Legislation 33 
to victims, witnesses, and potential witnesses.185  Additionally, the VWPA did the 
same with any witness tampering measures in § 1505 regarding federal agencies and 
legislative proceedings, and in § 1510 regarding federal investigations.186  Second, 
18 U.S.C. § 1512 “collected the witness-tampering provisions of these three sections 
(§§ 1503, 1505, and 1510), and broadened their coverage.”187 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512, Congress “eliminated the burden to prove that a de-
fendant acted with the intent to obstruct justice, by criminalizing tampering of any 
person, and by eliminating the requirement that a judicial proceeding be pending at 
the time of the offense.”188  This extended the protection to witnesses of grand jury 
hearings, official proceedings, and even regulatory and administrative matters.189  
Furthermore, the use of the term “any person” is construed to include potential wit-
nesses, excused witnesses, grand jury witnesses, and also investigators.190  Lastly, § 
1512 also included influencing a witness through misleading conduct as a crime.191  
In 1988, Congress amended § 1512 to include acts that did not involve coercive 
conduct.192  “The amendment changed the language of § 1512(b) from ‘or threatens 
another person’ to ‘threatens, or corruptly persuades another person,’ thereby making 
§ 1512(b) applicable to non-coercive forms of witness tampering.”193  A divide exists 
as to whether the new language in § 1512 was meant to remove witness tampering 
from the scope of § 1503.194   
In conclusion, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1512, under the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act of 1982, as part of a comprehensive effort to correct the shortcomings 
of the protection offered to witnesses and victims under federal jurisdiction.  Section 
1512 extended the protection to even potential witness before the commencement of 
federal judicial proceedings.  Furthermore, it broadened the range of conduct consid-
ered obstructive to the administration of justice.  At this juncture, facts have not been 
disclosed to conclude any witness tampering has occurred.  Whether any witnesses 
to the Trump-Comey meeting, or witnesses to the Trump Tower meeting were af-
fected is likely a matter being investigated and remains to be seen. 
 
 
VIII. 18 U.S.C. § 1510 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE BEFORE THE INITIATION OF 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
 
Another potentially relevant obstruction provision in the context of the Trump 
                                                          
185   Haney, supra note 172, at 63.   
186   William Jeffress, Jr., The New Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1984). 
187   Id.  
188   Haney, supra note 172, at 64. 
189   Singh, supra note 105, at 1627; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1) (2012) (defining “official proceed-
ing” for purposes of §§ 1512 and 1513). 
190   Singh, supra note 105, at 1628.  
191   Jeffress, supra note 186, at 4.  
192   Eric C. Surette, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Witness Tampering Statute, 
185 A.L.R. Fed. 1, §2(b) (2003). 
193   Haney, supra note 172 at 65.  
194   Id. at 66; compare Surette, supra note 192 at §2(b), with id. 
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investigation is 18 U.S.C. § 1510, which addresses obstruction before the initiation 
of judicial proceedings.  Before the enactment of § 1510 of Chapter 73, Title 18, of 
the United States Code, it was arguably not a crime to obstruct criminal investigation 
or inquiry prior the initiation of proceedings within the scope of §§ 1503 or 1505.195  
To address any loopholes left by previous sections, Congress amended chapter 73, 
title 18, United States Code to included § 1510 to prohibit the obstruction of criminal 
investigations of the United States.196  “Section 1510 is an extension of §§ 1503 and 
1505 and provides potential witnesses and informants with the same protection af-
forded to actual witnesses, jurors, and others involved in judicial, administrative, or 
congressional proceedings.”197 
On November 3, 1967, Congress passed Public Law 90-123198 to enact § 1510.  
The Department of Justice had recommend this new section to Tittle 18 because pre-
viously it was not a federal crime to harass, intimidate, or assault a potential witness 
providing information to a federal investigation prior to the commencement of a 
case.199  In its recommendation, the House Committee on the Judiciary noted that §§ 
1503 and 1505 had been construed by the courts as applying only once a proceeding 
had begun, but not during the criminal investigation.200  Furthermore, when address-
ing the enactment of § 1510, the House Committee expressed the following in the 
Congressional Record: 
Public law 90-123 plugs a loophole in existing law.  Previous to its enact-
ment protection against intimidation was, according to court interpretation, 
available only after a criminal case had reached a court of law.  A danger-
ous inconsistency in the law resulted, for a witness or informant is subject 
to intimidation, or more violent harassment, at the investigative stage of a 
case just as surely as he is when and if a case comes to court.  
Pretrial intimidation is a favorite tactic of organized crime and provisions 
of Public law 90-123 are aimed in particular at affording protection to 
those courageous enough to provide information to Federal agencies on 
crime syndicate activities. This newly afforded protection should assist the 
FBI in its efforts to investigate the pernicious activities of organized crime 
in the United States.201  
The House Committee had an understandable concern for instances where fear 
would prevent the initiation of proceedings of the matters under investigation, and 
thus obstruct justice.202  With the previously mentioned concerns, Congress enacted 
                                                          
195   Margaret Shulenberger, Annotation, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1510 Punishing 
Obstruction of Criminal Investigations, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 875 (originally published in 1974); see also United 
States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) 
196   Act of Nov. 3, 1967, Pub.L. No. 90-123, 81 Stat. 362 (1967).   
197   Singh, supra note 105, at 1624–25.   
198   Act of Nov. 3, 1967, Pub.L. No. 90-123, 81 Stat. 362 (1967).  
199   Shulenberger, supra note 195, at §2. 
200   Id. 
201   113 CONG. REC. 37373 (1997).   
202   Shulenberger, supra note 195, at §2.   
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§ 1510 with the purpose of “extending the protection afforded witnesses and jurors 
in judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings, to informants and poten-
tial witnesses in Federal criminal investigations or inquiries before proceedings have 
been initiated.”203  Consequently, § 1510 had the purpose of prohibiting the obstruc-
tion of a criminal investigation.204  Although the House Committee aimed to avoid 
obstruction of criminal investigations, it explicitly stated that § 1510 could not be 
used by a Federal investigator to intimidate or harass a potential witness or informant 
“by reason of his giving false or misleading information about a criminal viola-
tion.”205 
To establish a prima facie case under § 1510, the government must establish the 
defendant: (1) willfully endeavored to prevent, by means of bribery, the communica-
tion of information relating to the violation of any criminal statute of the United 
States;206 (2) acted to prevent a third person from giving the information to the crim-
inal investigator, and (3) knew that the recipient of the information was a Federal 
investigator.207  Most courts have recognized as an element of the offense the need 
for the government to prove that at the time the defendant acted, there was a pending 
federal investigation.208  The legislative history of § 1510 highlight the broad range 
of activities it was intended to address.  Indeed, perhaps to highlight its broad sweep, 
§ 1510’s legislative history indicates that federal protection to witnesses who give 
information to state officials in violation of federal laws was considered, but deliber-
ately excluded from coverage under § 1510.209  According to the recommendation of 
the House Committee, “[i]t should be made clear that under the scope of the act state 
investigators are not included; only Federal investigators are included.”210  
In terms of its limit in the federal context, originally, § 1510(a) would “prohibit 
willful attempts, by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or 
threats of force, to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication to a Federal crimi-
nal investigator of information relating to a violation of a Federal criminal law.”211  
However, at the present time, § 1510 only punishes endeavors to obstruct justice 
through bribery due to the addition of § 1512 to Chapter 73, Title 18, of the United 
States Code in 1982.212  Thus, § 1510 extended the scope of protection against ob-
struction of justice to potential witnesses in federal criminal investigations before a 
judicial or administrative proceeding is initiated.213  Also, § 1510 only applies to 
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federal investigations and to individuals attempting to obstruct justice through brib-
ery.  
Federal courts interpreting § 1510 observe that, in terms of the defendant’s 
knowledge, the wrong only requires the “knowing commission of the act of interfer-
ing with a federal officer”.214  In other words, in order to incur criminal liability for 
interfering with a federal officer, a defendant must entertain merely the criminal in-
tent to do the acts specified in the statute, to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, 
intimidate or interfere with a federal officer while engaged in, or on account of, the 
performance of official duties.215  Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit in Davis v Wil-
liams, found that words alone may constitute obstruction of justice.216  However, the 
Fifth Circuit in United States v. San Martin, held the use of words, such as making a 
threat that is no more than a claim of liability for the governmental act is outside the 
scope of § 1510.217  The Eleventh Circuit in United States. v. Fields, found that a 
violation of § 1510 occurs by merely making false statements in anticipation of a 
judicial proceeding to a government investigator.218  Similarly, if words are tanta-
mount to a threat, a court may very well find a violation of the obstruction of justice 
statutes.219  Indeed, even drafting a letter urging a family member not to testify rises 
to the level of obstructing justice.220  
 In the related context of punishment enhancements, the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Sisti, found obstruction of justice where defendant made a phone call to ask 
a witness whether the witness knew if the defendant committed a wrong.221  The Sisti 
court concluded that the purpose of the phone call was to intimidate the witness de-
spite the fact that there were no words evincing a specific threat.222  In a similar con-
text of sentencing enhancements, the Eleventh Circuit found that the use of “code 
words” could be interpreted to provide the basis for a finding of obstruction of jus-
tice.223  A federal court in Michigan provided useful guidance concerning the use of 
words and obstruction of justice, stating “[t]here is no talismanic requirement that a 
defendant must say, ‘[d]on't testify’ or words tantamount thereto” to have committed 
obstruction of justice.”224  In perhaps the most aggressive decision on obstruction of 
justice stems from the Second Circuit decision in United States v. Fasolino, where 
the court found obstruction where the defendant asked an official acquainted with the 
judge in question “[c]ould . . . talk to the Judge, take him to lunch?”225  The defendant 
in Fasolino then repeated his request in the form of a statement: Appellant then asked 
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the person that knew the judge to “talk to the Judge and take him out to lunch.”226  
The Second Circuit did not take kindly to these coy efforts to pressure an official, 
and made clear, “[t]he crime is one that can be committed merely by words, and 
words are sometimes misunderstood…but the likelihood of a misunderstanding here 
was substantially removed by appellant's repetition of the solicitation albeit phrased 
first as a question and later as a declaration.”227 
In the context of the Trump investigation, Special Counsel Mueller and his team 
may very well find that President Trump’s effort to persuade FBI Director Comey to 
halt his investigation of Michael Flynn falls squarely within the purview of § 1510’s 
prohibitions.  If the facts so establish, and as mentioned above, President Trump de-
nies Comey’s account, § 1510 provides yet another basis for impeachment or federal 
indictment.  
In conclusion, the Act of March 2, 1831, showed the first real effort to combat 
obstruction of justice in the United States judicial system.  The Act distinguished 
obstruction of justice from contempt and made it into a separate crime.  This act 
survives today through 18 U.S.C. § 1503 which is considered “the wellspring from 
which most of the obstruction of justice provisions . . . arose.”228  Section 1503 is an 
effective tool to combat obstruction of justice during a federal judicial proceeding.  
Lastly, Congress enacted and amended § 1512 to correct the shortcomings of the 
protection offered to witnesses and victims under federal jurisdiction.  Finally, Con-
gress enacted § 1510 to extend the scope of protection against obstruction of justice 
to potential witnesses in federal criminal investigations before a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding is initiated.  Section 1510, and § 1503 are likely the provisions 
most likely to provide the legal basis for any action against President Trump.  
 
IX. IMPEACHMENT AND CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST A SITTING PRESIDENT 
 
“The President, Vice President and civil officers of the United States shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” 
— Article II, section 4, U.S. Constitution. 
 
“Judgment in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office … but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to law.” 
— Article I, section 9, U.S. Constitution. 
 
In terms of the issue of a sitting president being subject to criminal prosecution, 
most scholars believe that a president can be prosecuted, but there remains consider-
able debate on the matter.  Interestingly, if one is to believe news accounts of con-
versations between Mueller’s team and counsel for President Trump, Mueller and his 
team have purportedly taken the position that a sitting president cannot face criminal 
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prosecution while in office.229  Nevertheless, there is considerable support for the 
proposition that a president can be prosecuted.  Former counsel for Vice President 
Spiro Agnew, for instance, found “[t]hese passages explain that, despite all the polit-
ical rhetoric emanating from the White House, the Capitol building and elements of 
the media, if the House impeached and the Senate convicted Donald Trump, the only 
result of that Congressional action would be his removal from the Presidency.230  Ac-
cording to counsel for the former Vice President, who ultimately resigned his office, 
“[t]he argument that the President is immune from the criminal laws is just that — 
an argument.”231  Accordingly to Spiro Agnew’s counsel, the argument of presiden-
tial immunity involves two issues: 
First is the question of whether an obstruction of justice charge can be 
brought in this case.  The President’s supporters argue that key elements 
of any such indictment could not support a conviction.  If everything the 
President did was legal, they say, he could not possibly be convicted of a 
crime.  Indeed, the President was legally entitled to ask then–FBI Director 
James Comey to go easy on former National Security Advisor Flynn, and 
then  fire Comey for that or any other reason—just as he is legally entitled 
to fire Special Counsel Robert Mueller, Deputy Attorney General Rosen-
stein or anybody else in the Department of Justice.  But the law is clear: an 
otherwise legal act can be an obstruction of justice if undertaken for cor-
rupt purposes.232 
In terms of the question of whether a sitting president can be charged and indicted 
criminally, the former Vice President’s counsel goes on to cogently observe:  
 
The second question is not whether, but when. Can the President avoid in-
dictment while in office?  But again, there is no language in the Constitu-
tion saying he enjoys any such protection.  The Department of Justice itself 
has made this argument before with regards to Article I Officers.  I saw it 
first-hand.  During the then–Vice President Spiro Agnew bribery investi-
gation, our legal team argued on behalf of the Vice President that because 
he was subject to impeachment under Article II, Section 4, he was immune 
from criminal prosecution unless and until he had been impeached by the 
House and convicted by the Senate.  In effect, we argued that the Vice 
President had to be impeached and removed from office first—and 
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then criminal charges could proceed.  The Department vigorously rejected 
that claim.  They insisted there was nothing in the Constitution that said 
impeachment was the exclusive remedy for crimes committed by Article I 
Officers.233  
More recently, former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder opined on the immunity 
issue, and considers presidential immunity from criminal prosecution inconsistent 
with the U.S. Constitution.  Specifically, Holder stated “[a] sitting President can be 
indicted.  [The] Constitution does not anticipate allowing a president who used 
fraud to obtain the office to remain in power.  Executive branch paralysis during 
the criminal process is not a compelling argument- consider 25th Amendment.  A 
sitting president can be indicted.”234 
 Federal case law also seems to reject a special immunity for the president.  In 
United States v. Nixon,235 the United States Supreme Court heard a related issue: 
whether a special prosecutor can demand production of certain documents, specifi-
cally audio tapes, from the President in connection with an ongoing criminal investi-
gation.236  In response, President Nixon’s team opposed production, arguing execu-
tive privilege.237  The Supreme Court concluded “[n]either the doctrine of separation 
of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, 
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity 
from judicial process under all circumstances.238  Absent a claim of need to protect 
military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of pres-
idential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a 
criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute 
executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the 
function of the courts under the Constitution.”239  While the language of the  Court’s 
decision is useful, and makes clear that the President of the United States, absent 
some emergency, is subject to judicial process, the Court’s decision in Nixon does 
not address the broad issue of whether a sitting President can be charged with a crime.  
A provision of the U.S. Constitution suggests that a president cannot be charged with 
a crime while in office.  By implication, Article I, Section 3 suggests that punishment 
of the President while he or she is in office cannot go further than removal from 
office.  Specifically, the section states:  
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, 
trust or profit under the United States: but the party convicted shall never-
theless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, 
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according to law.240 
The above language of the Constitution has not resolved the issue because there 
remains considerable debate concerning whether a sitting president can be indicted 
criminally.  For instance, Yale Law Professor Akhil Reed Amar has observed “[t]he 
framers implicitly immunized a sitting president from ordinary criminal prosecu-
tion.”241  Eric M. Freedman, a law professor at Hofstra University takes a differing 
view.  In a law review article titled On Protecting Accountability,242 Professor Freed-
man argued that:  
[r]eading the Constitution to insulate an incumbent President from crimi-
nal liability would not only feed the imperial delusions to which too many 
high officials in this century have succumbed, but would undermine the 
fundamental concept of the President as an ordinary citizen temporarily 
exercising power delegated by We the People.243 
In terms of the U.S. Department of Justice position on the issue, it is telling that 
it has previously taken a position on the matter in previous impeachments.  During 
President Nixon’s impeachment controversy, attorneys for Department of Justice Of-
fice of Special Counsel on February 12, 1974, issued a report sent to the Nixon Spe-
cial Prosecutor Leon Jaworski, on the issue of the possibility of indicting a sitting 
president.  The report concluded:  
This office will soon be called upon by the Watergate Grand Jury for rec-
ommendations as to what actions it should take in light of the evidence that 
has been presented to it.  Since this evidence implicates the President in a 
conspiracy to obstruct justice, the Grand Jury will no doubt be anxious to 
receive our recommendation, and the reasons therefor, concerning appro-
priate action with respect to the President.  The purpose of this memoran-
dum is to aid the process of decision by focusing attention on two possible 
courses of action - indictment and presentment - and articulating the rea-
sons for which we believe that one of these courses should be recom-
mended to the Grand Jury.244 
The facts described to you in a separate memorandum, if proven true con-
stitute clear and compelling prima facie evidence of the President's partic-
ipation in a conspiracy to obstruct justice.  Assuming that the Grand Jury 
agrees with this assessment, then we are compelled by (1) our mandate to 
investigate and prosecute allegations involving the President; (2) the 
Grand Jury's sworn duty to make true presentment of all offenses that come 
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to its knowledge; and (3) the paramount importance of reaffirming the in-
tegrity of the law, to recommend that the Grand Jury express its judgment 
by the customary method of indictment or (if we conclude indictment is 
constitutionally barred or is otherwise inappropriate) by a presentment set-
ting out the evidence and the Grand Jury's conclusion of criminal activ-
ity.245 
The February 12, 1974, report found several reasons to support the conclusion that a 
sitting president could be criminally indicted.  Among the primary reasons for the 
special counsel report’s conclusion was “the necessity for vindicating the integrity of 
the law.”246  The drafters of the report stated that “[n]o principles are more firmly 
rooted in our traditions, or more at stake in the decision facing this office and the 
Grand Jury, than that there shall be equal justice for all and that ‘(n)o man in this 
country is so high that he is above the law.’”247  The drafters of the 1974 report also 
specifically rejected the argument that the political process of impeachment is the 
sole appropriate means to address presidential wrongdoing.  The constitutional allo-
cation of these separate functions means that to let "political" considerations of the 
kind now being debated in Congress intrude upon the decision-making of this office 
and of the Grand Jury would be to confuse the functions of law enforcement, of im-
peachment, and the result would be further to undermine public confidence in the 
integrity of the legal process.248 
 
The drafters of the 1974 report ultimately concluded:  
Thus, we believe that it would be impermissible for this office to determine 
its course of action on the basis of a belief that the President should or 
should not be removed from public office.  By the same token, we cannot 
responsibly leave the question of the President's criminal guilt or inno-
cence to the "political" process and the "political" judgment of impeach-
ment.  To do so, we feel, would be an abdication of our duties and those 
of the Grand Jury, premised only on the view 'that for the most powerful 
official in the country, the essence of "justice" is limited to the decision of 
his fitness to govern and to ouster from office if he is found wanting.249 
The Department of Justice’s Office of Special Counsel’s addressed the issue a 
few decades later in the context of President Bill Clinton’s impeachment.  In a May 
13, 1998 letter to Special Counsel Kenneth Starr, Ronald Rotunda, who happens to 
now be a law professor at Chapman University, addressed the issue.250  In the letter, 
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Professor Rotunda poses the question as follows: “You [Special Counsel Kenneth 
Starr] have asked my legal opinion as to whether a sitting President is subject to in-
dictment.  Does the Constitution immunize a President from being indicted for crim-
inal activities while serving in the office of president?”  Rotunda answers the question 
as follows:  
As this opinion letter makes clear, I conclude that, in the circumstances of 
this case, President Clinton is subject to indictment and criminal prosecu-
tion, although it may be the case he could not be imprisoned (assuming 
that he is convicted and that imprisonment is the appropriate punishment) 
until after he leaves that office.251  
In his analysis, Rotunda wrote:  
In this country, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the state 
that no one is “above the Law.”  The constitution grants no immunity from 
the criminal laws…As the judiciary has noted in the past, the President 
‘does not embody the nation’s sovereignty.  He is not above the law’s com-
mands…. The people do not forfeit through election the right to have the 
law construed against and applied to every citizen.  Nor does the Impeach-
ment Clause imply immunity from routine court process.  
Further, there is precedent that elected members of federal office are subject to in-
dictment and conviction.  In the case of former Speaker of the House, Jack Maskell, 
the Congressional Research Office addressed the issue in April 2, 2015, of whether 
a sitting member of Congress can be convicted criminally and removed from of-
fice.252  In doing so, it did not question whether a congressional representative could 
face criminal indictment and conviction.253  
Taking a different position concerning the President, on September 24, 1973, the 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel issued a report on the “Amenability 
of the President, Vice President and other Civil Officers to ‘Federal Criminal Prose-
cution while in Office.’”254  The report held that:  
[A]s a general proposition the Constitution does not require ---that an of-
ficer of the United States be impeached before criminal proceedings may 
be instituted against him.  In the second part we concluded that by virtue 
of his unique position under the Constitution the President cannot be the 
object of criminal proceedings while he is in office.255  
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The 1973 DOJ report further held: 
Thus it appears that under our constitutional plan it cannot be said either: 
the courts have the jurisdiction over the President as if he were an ordinary 
citizen or that the President is absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts in regard to any kind of claim.  The proper approach is to find 
the proper balance between the normal functions of the Presidency.256  
The report further reasoned, “in view of the unique aspects of the Office of the 
President, criminal proceedings against a President in office should not go beyond a 
point where they could result in so serious interference with the President’s perfor-
mance of his official duties that it would amount to an incapacitation.”257  Finally, 
the report observes, “the President is the symbolic head of the Nation.  To wound 
him by a criminal proceeding is to hamstring the operation of the whole governmental 
apparatus, both in foreign and domestic affairs.”258   
An October 16, 2000 report by the Department of Justice reached a similar con-
clusion.259  The memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel stated:  
In 1973, the Department concluded that the indictment or criminal prose-
cution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity 
of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions.  
We have been asked to summarize and review the analysis provided in 
support of that conclusion, and to consider whether any subsequent devel-
opments in the law lead us today to reconsider and modify or disavow that 
determination.  We believe that the conclusion reached by the Department 
in 1973 still represents the best interpretation of the Constitution.260 
In the conclusion of the 2000 Report, the Office of Legal Counsel provided: 
In 1973, the Department of Justice concluded that the indictment and crim-
inal prosecution of a sitting President would unduly interfere with the abil-
ity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned duties, 
and would thus violate the constitutional separation of powers.  No court 
has addressed this question directly, but the judicial precedents that bear 
on the continuing validity of our constitutional analysis are consistent with 
both the analytic approach taken and the conclusions reached.  Our view 
remains that a sitting President is constitutionally immune from indictment 
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and criminal prosecution.261 
The opinions of the Special Counsel’s office in both the Nixon and Clinton im-
peachment investigations as well as the arguments set forth by the Professor Freed-
man are thoughtful, and are far more persuasive than those that believe in an absolute 
form of presidential immunity.262  The defenders of presidential immunity focus on 
the importance of the office of the presidency and the need to not have the president 
encumbered by the threat of criminal prosecution.  However, this argument in favor 
of immunity fails in one significant and consequential regard: it effectively presup-
poses a sitting president cannot also be a criminal.  What if, as is believed by many, 
largely based on news reports at this point, President Trump in fact elevated to the 
highest office in this land by virtue of breaking the law.  If so, should he not only 
avoid prosecution, but also remain in an office he illegitimately acquired?  In other 
words, should presidential immunity allow for a criminal in the White House?  In-
deed, one of the President’ most recent and troubling allegations comes from his for-
mer counsel.  And though the facts at the time of this publication of this Article are 
still being developed, evidently the President’s long-time attorney, Michael Cohen, 
recently testified before a House of Representative Oversight Committee on, among 
other things, President Trump’s alleged violations of federal law. 263  Cohen testified 
President Trump, in violation of federal campaign finance laws, signed checks pay-
ing-off a former adult film star, Stormy Daniels, in order to obtain her silence con-
cerning her affair with Donald Trump.264  If the copy of a check signed by President 
Trump, provided by Mr. Cohen during his congressional testimony, and made to Co-
hen is proven to be issued for the purpose of paying off Ms. Daniels in order to avoid 
public scrutiny and assist then candidate Trump in his election efforts,265 such evi-
dence may indeed be persuasive evidence of criminal conduct.  This check may be 
the latest piece of evidence, and but one of many allegations in this matter that if 
proven true, establish the President has engaged in criminal activities.  Thus, if in fact 
President Trump, in addition to the many other potential claims against him, by virtue 
of his efforts at silencing a news story concerning his infidelity in order to ensure he 
would win the presidency, he would have violated federal law, and the country may 
in fact have a criminal in the White House.  Such a possibility, if true, obviously leads 
to horrific and utterly untenable results, and no theoretical argument of immunity due 
to how important the office of the presidency is should allow for anyone to obtain the 
office of the presidency through criminal acts.  
The more appropriate approach to the immunity issue is one which does not pro-
vide for a form of imperial immunity that would in effect sanction criminal conduct.  
Indeed, the law should emphasize democratic principles that all citizens are (1) equal; 
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(2) owe the very same duties to follow the law; and (3) no citizen is above the law.  
It is simply indefensible to give a president a blanket protection from the law if in 
fact the president obtained the very status by breaking the law.  Absent an existing 
national security reason, such as an ongoing unprovoked war, no President should 
have complete criminal immunity, especially if he or she committed crimes to obtain 
the office of the presidency.266  A president, as Professor Freedman has argued, 
should be treated as a citizen that happens to hold an office for a period of time, and 
therefore should be subject to our criminal law, thereby making the President subject 
to criminal indictment if the facts warrant it.  Further, the very office of the presidency 
and the power it yields should give all pause to ensure the office cannot be used to 
engage in a potential variety of wrongs.   
 Notwithstanding two differing views from the Office of Legal Counsel, the 1973 
and 2000 opinions of the Office of Special Counsel mirror many of the arguments of 
Professor Freedman, arguably the country’s leading scholar on the matter.  The op-
posing view against indicting a sitting president for the most part focuses on the ar-
gument that to allow indictment will simply do too much harm to the country if in 
fact it becomes the basis to allow a wrongdoer to keep an office obtain through crim-
inal conduct.  Such a stance not only invites avoidance of the law by our country’s 
highest official, it effectively puts that official above the law.  Such a position falls 
under its own weight: if a president cannot be subject to our criminal laws because 
the duties of the president are just too important, doesn’t that same argument apply 
to thwart any efforts at removing a sitting president, by impeachment or otherwise?  
Under this tortured logic, the office of the presidency is just too important to have a 
president impeached.  Obviously, Article II’s Impeachment Clause rejects such an 
absurd defense of the office and its duties.  Therefore, the positions supporting in-
dictment appropriately focus on fundamental values of equality, transparency, and 
accountability.  These values ultimately lead the authors here to the inevitable posi-
tion that a president should be subject to criminal indictment if the facts warrant it. 
 
X. VARIOUS FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS THAT MAY GIVE RISE TO OBSTRUCTION 
CHARGES 
 
The focus of the next section is to briefly provide an overview of the facts behind 
the two leading factual allegations associated with a potential Trump obstruction of 
justice charge.  The first pertains to the Michael Flynn investigation, and related facts 
including the now-infamous Trump-Comey meeting, and ultimate Comey firing.  The 
second pertains to the Trump Tower meeting, and the alleged involvement before and 
after the meeting by President Trump.  
 
A.  The Michael Flynn Investigation, the Comey-Trump Meeting, and Ultimate 
Comey Firing 
 
In order to put a factual basis related to the legal analysis addressed earlier, an 
overview of the factual accounts relating to various acts President Donald Trump is 
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accused of undertaking will be set forth.  After each factual recitation, a brief legal 
analysis will be undertaken pursuant to the obstruction of justice statutes discussed 
above.  The first of many factual allegations relating to the Trump administration 
seem to be concerning former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn.  Early on in 
the Trump administration, Flynn became the center of scandal when according to 
Vice President Pence and others, Flynn was caught lying to Pence about the details 
of a phone call Flynn made to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.267  It was re-
ported that Flynn discussed sanctions against Russia with Kislyak, and then lied to 
federal investigators about the contents of the call.268 
A month before President Trump took office, his national security adviser, Mi-
chael Flynn, held a private conversation with the Russian Ambassador to the United 
States, Sergey Kislyak.269  At first, transition officials stated that the purpose of the 
call had been to discuss a Trump-Putin telephone call after the inauguration and for 
Kislyak to extend an invitation to Trump administration to visit Kazakhstan.270  The 
call prompted speculations of whether the topic of sanction on Russia was also dis-
cussed in the conversation.271  The timing of the call coincided with the Obama ad-
ministration’s announcement that new sanctions would be imposed in response to 
Russian interference in the 2016 Presidential election.272  Furthermore, it was re-
ported on December 30, 2016, that President Vladimir Putin had announced that he 
would not retaliate against President Obama’s decision to impose new sanctions and 
expel Russian diplomats.273  In addition, Putin issued a statement that read:  
While we reserve the right to take reciprocal measures, we’re not going to 
downgrade ourselves to the level of irresponsible ‘kitchen’ diplomacy. . . 
. In our future steps on the way toward the restoration of Russia-United 
States relations, we will proceed from the policy pursued by the admin-
istration” of Donald J. Trump.274 
This announcement came as a surprise since the United States and Russia have a 
long history of “reciprocal explosions,” and Russian officials had been threatening to 
retaliate against the Obama imposed sanctions.275  Even the Russian foreign minister, 
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Sergey V. Lavrov, had recommended measures to retaliate on national television.276 
As Inauguration Day approached, the Obama admiration grew more suspicious 
of possible interaction between the Trump associates and Russian officials.277  On 
January 2, 2017, Obama administration officials found out about the telephone con-
versation between Flynn and Kislyak on December 29, the same day the new Russian 
sanctions were announced.278  On January 12, 2017, the news of the telephone con-
versation publically broke and a Trump official confirmed them.279  The following 
day, then-White House Press Secretary, Sean Spicer, denied that Flynn discussed 
sanctions with Kislyak.280  On January 14, 2016, Michael Flynn informed Vice Pres-
ident Mike Pence that he had not discussed Russian sanction in his conversation.281  
In turn, the Vice President went on to defend Flynn on a series of televised shows the 
following day.282  
On January 22, 2017, after being sworn in as President Trump’s National Secu-
rity Advisor, it was reported that Michael Flynn was under counterintelligence inves-
tigation for communications with Russian officials.283  This officially made Flynn 
the first person under the Trump White House to come under scrutiny due to contact 
with the Russian government.284  The next day, during the administration’s very first 
White House briefing, Sean Spicer stated that during Flynn and the Russian Ambas-
sador’s conversation four subjects were discussed.285  
One was the loss of life that occurred in the plane crash that took their 
military choir, two was Christmas and holiday greetings, three was to – to 
talk about a conference in Syria on ISIS and four was to set up a – to talk 
about after the inauguration setting up a call between President Putin and 
President Trump.  In the past Michael Flynn had an amicable relation.286 
When further questioned, Sean Spicer stated that the conversation had been lim-
ited to those topics and that General Flynn had said so himself.287  On this same note, 
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the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) asked Michael Flynn about his conversa-
tion with Sergey Kislyak and whether he had discussed the new Russian sanctions.288  
In response, Flynn denied discussing U.S. sanctions against Russia with the ambas-
sador Sergey Kislyak.289  
On January 26, 2017, the Justice Department informed the Trump administration 
that its National Security Advisor had not been truthful about his interaction with the 
Russian ambassador, and that “he could be at risk for being for being blackmailed by 
Russian intelligence.”290  Consequently, the FBI interview put Flynn in legal jeop-
ardy as lying to the FBI is a felony.291  In February, Flynn contradicted his previous 
statements when he changed his story to say that “while he had no recollection of 
discussing sanctions, he couldn’t be certain that the topic never came up.”292  Shortly 
after, the White House announced that President Trump was evaluating the contro-
versy surrounding Michael Flynn and discussing with Vice President Pence about the 
disputed telephone conversation.293  Later in a televised interview on February 13, 
Kelly Ann Conway, a White House Counselor, said that Michael Flynn still had the 
“full confidence” of President Trump.294  Later, on that same day, Michael Flynn 
resigned as National Security Advisor to the Trump administration.295  As part of his 
resignation letter, Flynn said that during the course of his duties he had “inadvertently 
briefed the Vice President-Elect and others with incomplete information regarding 
[his] phone calls with the Russian Ambassador.”296  Flynn’s sudden exist marked the 
shortest tenure for a National Security Advisor in the history of the position.297 
On March 30th, Flynn offered to testify in front of the House and Senate Intelli-
gence Committees that were conducting investigations into the Trump-Russia ties in 
exchange for immunity.298 Furthermore, Flynn’s attorney, Robert Kelner, stated that 
“General Flynn certainly has a story to tell, and he very much wants to tell it, should 
circumstances permit.”299  However, a congressional official stated that investigators 
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were unwilling to make a deal until they were further along in their investigation.300  
Later in the year, Flynn was formally charged with making a false statement to the 
FBI about his communications with the Russian Ambassador.301  As it turns out, there 
was evidence that Flynn had urged Sergey Kislyak “to refrain from escalating the 
situation in response to sanctions that the U.S. had imposed against Russia.”302  Mi-
chael Flynn pleaded guilty.303  The following day, Trump tweeted that he “had to 
fire” Flynn because he’d lied to the FBI, seemingly confirming that he knew Flynn 
had committed a crime when he got rid of him.304  Trump’s lawyer, John Dowd, who 
recently left the President’s legal team, later claimed he had written the tweet, and 
that it was incorrect.305    
After Flynn resigned, FBI Director James Comey took into his own hands the 
responsibility of finding out what occurred with those phone call conversations.306  It 
was then reported by the New York Times in May 2017, that a conversation between 
Trump and Comey took place in the Oval Office that is said to be the center of 
Mueller’s obstruction of justice investigation.307  During the meeting, Trump pur-
portedly told Comey to “let this go,” meaning Trump was asking the FBI to stop 
investigating Flynn.308  Comey then discussed the meeting in an interview with ABC 
News.  Comey stated that Trump’s comment was more of a “direction” rather than a 
suggestion.309  At first, Trump denied telling Comey to back off the investigation, 
but his son went on television to claim that his father’s words were not meant as an 
order, but as a “hey, hope this happens” suggestion.310  Obviously, these two accounts 
by members of the Trump family contradict each other.  How can President Trump’s 
son, Donald Trump Jr., argue that his father’s words were not meant to be taken lit-
erally when Trump denied even saying those words at all? 
With respect to related facts, President Trump eventually fired Comey on May 
9, 2017, and according to Comey, the firing was due to Comey’s failure to swear 
loyalty, the fact that Comey continued the investigation, and because Comey refused 
to state publicly that the President was not under investigation.311  The official White 
House statement on May 9th concerning the firing was that the President “acted based 
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on the clear recommendations” of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral.312  President Trump, in an interview two days later, said he was going to fire 
Comey “regardless of recommendation.”313  Then, somewhat shockingly, in a May 
11th television interview with Lester Holt, President Trump admitted that:  
[Rosenstein] made a recommendation, but regardless of recommendation 
“I was going to fire Comey, knowing there was no good time to do it,” 
Trump said.  “And, in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself, I 
said, you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up 
story.  It’s an excuse by the Democrats for having lost an election that they 
should have won. 314  
Thus, according to the President’s television admission, the Comey firing and 
the reason for it, appears to be directly connected to Comey investigation of Michael 
Flynn and Flynn’s connection to Russia.  Accordingly, President Trump’s firing of 
FBI Director Comey may be deemed related to any potential obstruction charge con-
cerning Flynn, or may provide an independent basis for an obstruction charge, par-
ticularly under § 1510, which addresses obstruction before the initiation of judicial 
proceedings.  If, in fact, President Trump attempted to thwart an ongoing investiga-
tion, and ultimately fired the FBI Director conducting that investigation such actions 
may very well fall under both 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and 18 U.S.C. § 1510.  
An interesting recent approach Mueller is taking to get more evidence against 
Trump is by scrutinizing Trump’s tweets.  The famous forum of Twitter has been 
used by the President as a communication platform for mounting attacks on celebri-
ties and political rivals.  Although Trump has been legally advised to avoid social 
media platforms to announce his “next moves,” he seems to enjoy the attention it 
brings.  The attention Trump once loved can now turn dirty as Mueller is reviewing 
every single tweet to find any kind of piece of evidence on a potential obstruction of 
justice case.315  As of today, Mueller and his team are focusing on four findings on 
his case of obstruction of justice against the President.  First, Trump’s intent to fire 
former FBI Director James Comey.  Second, his role in the crafting of a misleading 
public statement on the nature of a June 2016 Trump Tower meeting between his son 
and Russians.  Third, Trump’s dangling of pardons before grand jury witnesses who 
might testify against him.316  Fourth,317 pressuring Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
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not to recuse himself from the Russia investigation.318  According to Lisa Kern Grif-
fin, a criminal law expert at Duke University, “if Trump exercises his power-even his 
lawful power- with a corrupt motive of interfering with an investigation, that’s ob-
struction.”319  Given the back-and-forth defenses by Trump, his son, and the Trump 
defense team, it seems like Mueller’s case may very well be stronger than what was 
first thought.  
In terms of the potentially applicable obstruction of justice laws, if in fact former 
FBI Director James Comey’s account of the Trump meeting is deemed accurate, Pres-
ident Trump may very well have violated several federal obstruction of justice laws.  
Each of these violations may not only give rise to impeachment as a high crime and 
misdemeanor, it may subject President Trump to indictment.  First, if Trump’s “re-
quests” that FBI Comey end his investigation of Michael Flynn are deemed enough 
to satisfy an effort to threaten or otherwise intimidate Comey to halt the investigation, 
President Trump may be found to have obstructed justice under 18 U.S.C § 1503.  
Section 1503’s requirement of a pending proceeding under a classic obstruction 
charge will invariably be the subject of debate.  Given time constraints and the nature 
of political maneuvering, resolution of a claim brought under a traditional obstruction 
charge will likely occur in a courtroom setting with an indictment, if one is ever 
brought, instead of the political process, that is, impeachment.  There is nevertheless 
at least a colorable basis to make the legal argument for an obstruction of justice 
charge under § 1503.   
If President Trump “requested” Director Comey to end the Flynn investigation, 
but in reality the so-called request was nothing more than the most powerful person 
in the world telling a subordinate what that subordinate should do, then President 
Trump may have obstructed justice.  Notwithstanding the pendency argument, Trump 
apparently sought to obtain something otherwise forbidden by law—the termination 
of an FBI investigation against his ally—Michael Flynn.  There is evidence suggest-
ing that Trump discussed (or communicated his plan to discuss) the Flynn issue with 
Comey.  It is undisputed that Attorney General Jeff Sessions and Trump’s then-Chief 
of Staff, Reince Priebus, left Comey alone with Trump to allow them to discuss the 
Flynn investigation.320  If so, then these two cabinet members may have unwittingly 
been part of an otherwise unlawful conspiratorial undertaking under § 1503.  The 
facts concerning this matter will turn on a question of credibility.  There is little doubt 
what Trump thinks of Comey, as evidenced by his tweets: “James Comey is a proven 
LEAKER & LIAR.  Virtually everyone in Washington thought he should be fired for 
the terrible job he did-until he was, in fact, fired.  He leaked CLASSIFIED infor-
mation, for which he should be prosecuted.  He lied to Congress under OATH.  He 
is a weak and...”321  In yet another poignant presidential assessment, President Trump 
wrote: “...untruthful slime ball who was, as time has proven, a terrible Director of the 
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FBI. His handling of the Crooked Hillary Clinton case, and the events surrounding 
it, will go down as one of the worst “botch jobs” of history. It was my great honor to 
fire James Comey!”322  Director Comey, for his part, is far from being able to pick 
up the biblical stone as he recently wrote a book addressing the meeting, among other 
things, obviously profiting from his experience in the midst of a historic investiga-
tion—from a principled perspective, poor timing at the very least.  In the end, the 
question will turn on these and perhaps additional facts Special Prosecutor Mueller 
has concerning the meeting.  If they support Comey’s account, a conspiracy to ob-
struct justice recommendation or charge is likely, and an obstruction of justice charge 
or recommendation may also be brought.  In addition, if there are any facts where 
potential witnesses or other officials, including Reince Priebus, Jeff Sessions, James 
Comey, or any other person aware of the details of the Trump-Comey meeting were 
threatened or intimidated by anyone in the administration, there is the additional pos-
sibility of claims being brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510 and 1512.  Obviously, 
there would have to be facts supporting such intimidation efforts, a matter, if at all 
present, at this juncture is exclusively within knowledge of the Special Prosecutor 
and his team.  
 
B.  Trump Tower Meeting and Subsequent Explanation 
 
On June 3, 2016, Rob Goldstone, a music publicist who had helped the Trump 
organization bring the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant to Russia sent an email to Donald 
Trump Jr.323  On June 9, 2016, the Trump Tower gathering took place.324  Despite 
initial untruths from the Trump camp, the purpose of the meeting was to exchange 
information and official documents that would incriminate Hillary Clinton, and her 
dealings with Russia.325  Trump Jr., Goldstone, Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort 
attended the meeting,326 and testified that Clinton was only briefly discussed, and no 
documents were exchanged.327  The following eight people evidently were present in 
the Trump Tower meeting: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, Paul Manafort, Rob 
Goldstone, Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rinat Akhmetshin, Anatoli Samochornov, and 
Irakly Kaveladze.328  The Russian participants were: Natalia Veselnitskaya, a prom-
inent Russian Lawyer who, in 2018, evidently said she was an "informant of the 
Kremlin, and that's she's been actively communicating with the office of the Russian 
prosecutor general since 2013;”329 Rinat Akhmetshin, a Russian Lobbyist against the 
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Magnitsky Act, who was working with Natalia Veselnitskaya ;330 Anatoli Samochor-
nov who acted as a translator;331 and Irakly Kaveladze who was present “as a repre-
sentative of Aras and Emin Agalarov, the wealthy Russians who first requested the 
meeting be arranged.”332  
Initially, according to the Trump camp, the topic of conversation regarded “adop-
tion of Russian children,”333 and the Magnitsky Act, a law that sanctions Russians 
who commit human rights abuses.334  According to those who attended the meeting, 
it only lasted about twenty to thirty minutes.335  The date of the meeting is significant 
since June marked the unofficial start of the general election, and after months of 
intense campaigning during the primaries, Hilary Clinton and Donald Trump turned 
their attention to one another.336  Although there is no evidence that the Trump cam-
paign received any incriminating information about Clinton during the Trump Tower 
meeting, President Trump and those involved have had shifting responses regarding 
what took place during the meeting.  
First, after the New York Times reported the Trump Tower meeting, Trump Jr. 
released a statement in response on July 8, 2017.  The statement read: 
It was a short introductory meeting. I asked Jared (Kushner) and Paul 
(Manafort) to stop by. We primarily discussed a program about the adop-
tion of Russian children that was active and popular with American fami-
lies years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was 
not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up.  I was asked 
to attend the meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the 
person I would be meeting with beforehand.337 
Trump Jr. did not mention the Clintons nor answer questions as to why he 
thought it was necessary to invite Manafort and Kushner to the meeting.338  The fol-
lowing day, the Times reported that Trump Jr. had been promised incriminating in-
formation about Clinton prior to the meeting.339  After this, Trump Jr.’s explanation 
changed to say that while he had been offered information, the lawyer’s statements 
had been “nonsense” and not meaningful.340  On July 10, Trump Jr. tweeted in re-
sponse “Obviously I'm the first person on a campaign to ever take a meeting to hear 
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info about an opponent. . . went nowhere but had to listen.”341  He went on to tweet 
that there were no inconsistencies in his statements, just further clarification because 
the meeting ended up being about adoptions.342  As information kept surfacing, 
Trump Jr. published the emails between himself and Rob Goldstone, where it was 
confirmed that he tried to obtain information from the Russian lawyer.343  However, 
Trump Jr. maintained that “he believed the information on Clinton was merely a ‘pre-
text for the meeting,’ and that the adoption program and the Magnitsky Act consti-
tuted its true agenda.”344 
Following these events, President Trump’s lawyer, Jay Sekulow, denied the 
President’s involvement in Trump Jr.’s initial statements about the Trump Tower 
meeting.345  Sekulow stated that he “wasn’t involved in the statement drafting at all, 
nor was the President.”346  Days later, on July 31, 2017, the Washington Post pub-
lished an article exposing that President Trump had dictated the first statement that 
Trump Jr. released to the public.347  In response, Sekulow issued a simple statement 
“[a]part from being of no consequence, the characterizations are misinformed, inac-
curate, and not pertinent.”348  The following day, on August 1, 2017, the White House 
Press Secretary, Sarah Sanders, issued another statement assuring the press that 
Trump Jr.’s statements were true.349  Furthermore, Sanders stated that apart from 
there been no inaccuracies in the statement, the President had “weighed in as any 
father would, based on the limited information that he had.”350  However, she did not 
offer any explanation for the varying accounts on what took place in Trump Tower, 
nor the reason behind the President’s involvement in his son’s statement.351  
Additionally, on January 29, 2018, Sekulow and John M. Dowd, White House 
Counsel, sent a letter to Mueller where they contradict Sanders’s version of the 
story.352  Instead of merely weighing in, the letter asserts that “the President dictated 
a short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, 
Donald Trump, Jr.”353  President Trump was not only involved in the decision to 
construct Trump Jr.’s allegedly misleading statement, but actually “dictated” the 
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statement.354  Consequently, Sekulow stated that he made a mistake denying the Pres-
ident’s involvement in Trump Jr.’s statement.355  While stories continue to change, 
one thing is clear: the President’s advisers worry that his direct involvement in his 
son’s statement leave him vulnerable to allegations of a cover-up.356 
Out of this controversy aroused an important question: was the President aware 
of the purpose of the meeting?  The facts suggest he may have been aware of it.357  
At first, the Trump administration and those involved in the meeting denied the Pres-
ident was aware of the reason behind the meeting.358  After the Trump Tower meeting 
was exposed in July 2017, President Trump told the New York Times “[n]o, I didn’t 
know anything about the meeting. . . must have been a very unimportant meeting, 
because I never even heard about it.”359  Furthermore, in September 2017, Trump Jr. 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that he had not told his father about 
the email exchange because he did not want to bring information that is “unsubstan-
tiated,” and because the emails had nothing to do with the President.360  On a turn of 
events, almost a year later, President Donald Trump changed his story regarding the 
meeting.361  
  Despite President Trump’s initial denial of any knowledge of the meeting, a few 
days after the first email, President Trump on June 7th—the day the June 9th Trump 
Tower meeting was finalized —stated “I am going to give a major speech on probably 
Monday of next week and we’re going to be discussing all of the things that have 
taken place with the Clintons,” President Trump told a crowd at a campaign rally.362  
“I think you’re going to find it very informative and very, very interesting.”363  Sub-
sequently, President Trump denied knowledge of the meeting when it was occurring, 
and included Trump Jr.’s initial statement that never mentioned the promise of dirt 
on Clinton.364  
Then, in May 2018, it was revealed that back in January, 2018, President 
Trump’s lawyers acknowledged to Mueller that not only did President Trump know 
about Trump Jr.'s initial statement, but he dictated that statement himself.365  In a let-
ter to Mueller, President Trump’s attorneys wrote:  
                                                          
354   Parker, supra note 347.  
355   Eli Watkins, Trump Attorney Blames 'Bad Information' for His False Statements on Trump Tower 
Meeting, CNN (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/05/politics/jay-sekulow-trump-tower/index.html. 
356   Parker, supra note 347. 
357   See Jonathan Lemire, Trump Acknowledges Purpose of Meeting With Russian Lawyer, CHI. TRIB-
UNE (Aug. 6, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-russian-lawyer-meet-
ing-20180805-story.html. 
358   Abigail Simon, supra note 325. 
359   Id.  
360   Id. 
361   Lemire, supra note 357. 
362   Natasha Bertrand, The Case for a Trump-Russia Conspiracy Just Got a Little Stronger, THE AT-
LANTIC (July 27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/trump-michael-cohen-trump-
tower-meeting/566303/. 
363   Id.  
364   Marshall Cohen, Trump Lawyers Say He 'Dictated' Statement on Trump Tower Meeting, Contra-
dicting Past Denials, CNN (June 2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/02/politics/trump-lawyers-statement-
trump-tower-russians/index.html. 
365   Id.  
  
56 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:2] 
You have received all of the notes, communications and testimony indi-
cating that the President dictated a short but accurate response to the New 
York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump, Jr…. His son then 
followed up by making a full public disclosure regarding the meeting, in-
cluding his public testimony that there was nothing to the meeting and cer-
tainly no evidence of collusion.366  
After his initial denial, just days before this article goes to print, President Trump 
apparently changes his position again and tweets that the Trump Tower meeting was 
to get information on his opponent.367  On August 5, 2018, Trump tweets:  
Fake News reporting, a complete fabrication, that I am concerned about 
the meeting my wonderful son, Donald, had in Trump Tower.  This was a 
meeting to get information on an opponent, totally legal and done all the 
time in politics - and it went nowhere.  I did not know about it!368  
As news accounts concerning details about the Trump Tower meeting continue, 
the facts keep changing.369  Even in Trump’s Sunday tweet, he claims the Trump 
Tower meeting was completely okay and at the same time seems astute enough to 
want to distance himself from it.370  Yet, subsequent accounts provide that former 
Trump legal team spokesperson, Mark Corallo, resigned because he believed he was 
witnessing obstruction of justice when President Trump dictated the letter concerning 
the Trump Tower meeting.371 
In terms of potential obstruction of justice legal charges or recommendations ad-
dressed above, it appears the Trump legal team have some serious problems with the 
President’s involvement with the Trump Tower meeting.  When Trump’s personal 
attorney, Michael Cohen, became subject of a federal investigation, Cohen evidently 
told Mueller’s team President Trump knew of the purpose of the Trump Tower meet-
ing before it occurred.372  As one news account recently observed, “If Donald 
Trump’s former fixer is right—that the president knew his staff planned to meet with 
Russians—it’d be a dramatic development on at least two fronts of Robert Mueller’s 
investigation.”373  As one scholar recently opined: “[t]here are definite legal conse-
quences to Cohen’s statement [concerning the President’s knowledge of the Trump 
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Tower meeting].”374  Cornell Law Professor Jens David Ohlin observed, “[t]his reeks 
of a criminal conspiracy.  It doesn’t matter if nothing came of the meeting.  If Trump 
knew about the meeting and was okay with it, Trump and those around him could be 
guilty of an inchoate conspiracy.”375  Former federal prosecutor, Harry Sandick, ob-
served, if Cohen’s reported version is correct, "it would make it very hard for Trump 
to say there was no collusion,’ he said.  “There would also be a potential obstruction 
charge, because he tried to prevent prosecutors from knowing what happened.”376  
Indeed, it is a violation of federal elections laws for anyone to solicit contributions 
from foreign nationals.377  The election laws make clear that the solicitation can in-
clude in-kind things of value.378  The federal election regulations provide a broad 
reading of contributions to include making “any contribution or donation of money 
or other thing of value, or making any expenditure, independent expenditure, or dis-
bursement in connection with any federal, state or local election in the United 
States.”379  
 
The Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits knowingly soliciting, accepting or 
receiving contributions or donations from foreign nationals.  In this context, "know-
ingly" means that a person: 
 
(1) Has actual knowledge that the funds solicited, accepted, or re-
ceived are from a foreign national; 
 
(2) Is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the funds 
solicited, accepted, or received are likely to be from a foreign national; or 
 
(3) Is aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to inquire whether the 
source of the funds solicited, accepted or received is a foreign national.380  
 
If proven accurate, the facts above concerning the Trump Tower meeting should 
give the Trump legal team some very serious trouble.  Both the assertions of Cohen 
and the President’s own contemporaneous promise to provide an important speech 
concerning Hillary Clinton strongly suggests that the President did have at least some 
knowledge of the meeting and its purpose.  Such knowledge, and the agreement to 
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go forward with said meeting may expose President Trump to criminal issues.  
As examined above, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503, federal law prohibits conspir-
acy against obstruction justice.  If Trump and his team had knowledge that his son 
and others were entering into a meeting in order to obtain “dirt” on then Democratic 
candidate Hillary Clinton, then President Trump was entering into a meeting solicit-
ing something of value from a foreign national in violation of federal election laws, 
under 52 U.S.C. § 30121 and generally, 11 CFR 110.20.381  His efforts to cover up 
the purpose, his knowledge of the purpose of the meeting demonstrates knowledge 
of the meeting’s wrongful nature.  The fact the Trump team planned on participating 
in the meeting, and did in fact participate in meeting, may demonstrate they conspired 
to obtain something otherwise forbidden by law; soliciting something of value from 
a foreign national.  Their repeated subsequent efforts to cover up the purpose of the 
meeting not only highlights their knowledge, intent, and awareness of their conspir-
acy.  Said knowledge may very well also rise to a classic obstruction of justice under 
§ 1503, though it is likely there will be great debate concerning the “pending pro-
ceeding” requirement under an obstruction charge as opposed to a conspiracy to ob-
struct charge.  The irony is that we may never really know the full extent and scope 
of the Trump Tower meeting.  We may never really know the truth behind the dis-
cussion of Trump and Flynn, or Comey.  President Trump has consistently made 




The potential impeachment, and possibly even indictment, of Donald Trump and 
members of his administration for obstruction of justice has captured both the country 
and the world’s attention.  While references to terms like collusion and obstruction 
are routinely bantered about, few have explained the legal standard and consequences 
of these terms of art.  In the end, an examination of federal law addressing the term 
collusion highlights the fact that while the word collusion is not listed as a wrong in 
any likely claim against the President, the term is well-defined in federal law.  Ulti-
mately, it is considered a factual analysis that can become the predicate acts to punish 
behavior in a host of legal settings.  In a potential Trump impeachment, collusion, or 
facts considered to be collusive may very well provide the basis for one or more 
obstruction of justice claims or charges.  Further, the federal offense of obstruction 
of justice provides an ample legal basis to find, if the facts so establish, that a presi-
dent, including President Trump can obstruct justice, and may very well have ob-
structed justice.  The catch-all provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is likely one of two 
primary provisions that may be used in any potential charges against Trump.  Indeed, 
there may be at least three independent legal justifications under the obstruction stat-
utes to conclude obstruction occurred in the Trump context, if once again the Special 
Prosecutor so establishes and the ultimate trier of fact so agrees.  A brief overview of 
the leading alleged factual wrongs by President Trump under the federal obstruction 
statutes establish that if in fact these allegations are proven and accepted, they provide 
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the factual predicates for a finding of obstruction of justice under federal law.  Fi-
nally, the question of whether a sitting president may face criminal charges should 
lead an ultimate arbiter of the issue to conclude a sitting president is in fact subject 
to criminal process.  In the end, if Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller decides there is 
a factual basis for the claims of presidential wrongdoing, and a trier of fact so agrees, 
federal law on obstruction of justice provides ample basis for articles of impeach-
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